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Abstract 
This thesis is a comprehensive study of fund management in Norway, with particular emphasis 
on active management and performance. The utilized sample include 59 Norwegian equity 
mutual funds from 1996-2014. In general, we apply well-known methodologies with different 
modifications, investigating the degree of active fund management and fund performance. Our 
analyses can be divided into three separate examinations to keep contextual tidiness. The 
yielded results should, however, be contemplated in coherence. 
First, we look at the degree of active management using the statistical measure R2. This is 
obtained from a regression of fund returns on a multifactor benchmark model. Lower R2 
indicates greater deviation from the benchmark, and our results indicate that half of the 
Norwegian equity funds are close to being index funds. We see that loading on the small-
minus-big risk factor is particularly prevalent, and captures most of the deviation from the 
market. 
Second, we examine the hypothesis that fund performance can be predicted by its degree of 
active management. Equity funds sorted into highest quartile lagged R2 generally outperforms 
the lowest quartile lagged R2. However, we do not find enough consistency in our results to 
prove that R2 is a credible predictor of performance. Moreover, we observe that the importance 
of preceding performance increases as R2 decreases. 
Third, we examine the effects of fund characteristics on its degree of active management. 
Across funds, more active management is positively associated with expenses and fund age. 
In addition, the investment style coefficients show that more active funds invest in small size 
stocks. 
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
“Think picking stocks is hard? Try picking a good mutual-fund manager.” 
Joe Light (Light, 2013), journalist Wall Street Journal 
Mutual funds have existed in Norway since the late 70’s. The market has developed and 
matured substantially during the 90’s. However, it is only in the recent years that the debate 
on actively managed funds versus passive funds has blossomed. Several studies aim to provide 
insight on whether active or passive funds obtain the best returns, and if there is persistence in 
returns or not. For example, Sørensen (2010) finds no evidence that Norwegian funds have 
created economic value compared to passive benchmarks. The growing debate on whether 
active funds are able to create returns that are superior to index fund are interesting as it is. 
However, we want to take the discussion one step further. Martijn Cremers, a leading 
researcher on mutual fund performance, said the following to the Wall Street Journal (2013), 
“The debate can’t just be active versus passive, not all active funds are alike”. Therefore, we 
want to conduct an analysis where we compare only active funds, and not indexes, to see if it 
is possible to pick winners based on their degree of active management. 
In an interview with the Wall Street Journal, Professor Amihud claimed, based on his insight 
in the US mutual fund market, that the great majority of funds are “closet-indexers” that nearly 
mimic common benchmarks (Light, 2013). Hence, investors should look for funds that are 
actually trying to beat their benchmark. Furthermore, Finanstilsynet (2015) (the financial 
supervisory authority of Norway) released a report regarding actively managed funds in early 
2015. The report revealed that DNB and Nordea sold funds as active, but when they, in fact, 
behaved as index funds.1 We find these revelations interesting as this has implications for the 
average investor and his choice of investments. As a result, we want to see how active 
Norwegian equity funds really are. When charging larger fees, fund managers indirectly 
promise that they will try to manage the fund in a manner that provides returns that are greater 
                                                          
1 Finanstilsynet - http://tinyurl.com/zu67bef 
2 
 
  
than that of an index. This is only obtainable by deviating its asset allocation from the 
benchmark, known as active management.  
1.2 Research Objective 
This thesis aims to shed light on Norwegian equity mutual funds to see how actively managed 
they are, and if it is possible to pick winners based on their degree of activeness. In addition, 
we want to identify the characteristics of active funds.  More specifically our goal for the thesis 
is to answer the following research questions. 
● How active are Norwegian equity mutual funds? 
Based on a simple and intuitive measure, R2, we will analyse how active Norwegian 
funds are compared to a benchmark model. 
● Is it possible to pick superior performing funds based on their degree of active 
management? 
We examine a strategy where we use lagged R2 as a performance indicator to see 
whether the degree of activeness is related to risk-adjusted returns. 
● What effect does fund characteristics have on active management? 
We examine if fund characteristics can explain the differences in R2. 
1.3 Thesis Purpose 
This thesis aims to highlight how actively managed Norwegian funds have been in the period 
1996 to 2014. We then try to unveil and explain if there is possible to pick winners among 
actively managed fund based on a measure that is easy to calculate and understand. We hope 
to contribute on the subject and provide new insight on the topic that could possibly lead to a 
shift in the debate from not only active versus passive, but to which active fund to choose. 
Lastly, we hope that our results will be of importance for academics and investors trying to 
maximize their utility when investing their savings. 
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1.4 Structure of the Paper 
We begin with building a framework on mutual funds and the industry. We discuss the 
different types of funds and especially equity mutual funds. Further, we provide a definition 
of active and passive management before we enlighten fund fee structure. 
Next, chapter 3 describes the relevant theory needed to understand the work conducted in this 
thesis. We touch on the basics of linear regression and our preferred method, ordinary least 
squares. In particular, we present and elaborate our measure of activeness, R2. We take a walk 
through the field of financial theory discussing active management, to develop an 
understanding of why active management exists. Additionally, we introduce several measures 
of active management and culminate with defining what is considered an active fund and not. 
Chapter 4 provides a review of existing literature on the subject. To understand common 
approaches, consistencies and inconsistencies we spent a great amount of time delving into 
empirical results. We present previous work on the degree of active management, the link 
between active management and performance, and fund performance in general. 
In chapter 5, we outline the methods and applications used in our analysis. We also check 
whether our sample meets the requirements of the methods, and potential adjustments made 
to comply with the prerequisites. 
A description of our dataset is found in chapter 6. We discuss the criteria set for including a 
fund, and present the sample. Furthermore, we address survivorship bias and adjustments 
applied to our sample. Lastly, we provide summary statistics for our utilized sample. 
Chapter 7 contain our analysis and answer to the research questions. We comment and 
interpret our result, and try to assess them in context with previous work. 
Concluding remarks are made in chapter 8. 
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2. An Introduction to Equity Mutual Funds 
To make sure our reader fully understand our work we provide a thorough framework for the 
thesis. We start by introducing the mutual fund market in Norway, where we will define what 
a mutual fund is and enlighten some historic facts and the development of the market. We then 
move on to define different types of funds and especially the type used in our sample. Lastly, 
the differences between active and passive management are explained.  
2.1 Mutual Funds – What Are They? 
The common name for an open-end investment company is mutual fund. By open-end, we 
mean that issuance and redemption of shares happen at their net asset value, such that investors 
can "cash out" whenever they want to. Mutual funds are together with bank deposit and stocks 
the dominant form of financial saving in Norway (Statistics Norway, 2015). The financial 
intermediaries, or mutual funds, collect capital from individual investors and invest in a 
potentially wide range of securities or other assets. The key idea behind mutual funds is 
pooling of assets. Each investor has a claim to the mutual fund in proportion to the amount 
invested. A mutual fund provides a mechanism for small investors to join forces and obtain 
the benefits of large-scale investing. First, they offer diversification and divisibility such that 
small investors can act as large investors. Secondly, investors get the opportunity to achieve 
superior investment results due to professional management and a full-time staff of analysts. 
Thirdly, the possibility of large trading volumes gives mutual funds substantial savings on 
commissions and brokerage fees. Lastly, there are other benefits such as record keeping and 
administration and tax benefits (Bodie, 2014). In Norway, mutual funds are managed after the 
"Mutual fund law" (Verdipapirfondloven), which assures responsible management of the 
investor's assets. In addition, mutual funds must invest according to its stated investment 
strategy in the mandatory prospectus. 
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2.2 The Norwegian Fund Market 
In Norway, there are currently (31.10.2015) 21 companies offering mutual funds to investors. 
The largest mutual fund providers in Norway and their market share based on total asset under 
management (AUM) are presented below. 
Table 1: Top five fund providers in Norway 
Fund name Market share (#funds) 
DNB 25% (87) 
KLP 16% (33) 
Nordea 11% (100) 
Skagen 11% (32) 
Storebrand 11% (38) 
In parenthesis are the number of funds provided. The count includes all 
types of funds offered. 
These five account for a substantial part of the Norwegian market and offers 290 different 
mutual funds of a total 618. In total, their AUM is 691 billion NOK of a total AUM in Norway 
of 918 billion NOK. The figure below shows the development of AUM from 1996 to 2014 
divided into different types of funds (Statistics Norway, 2015).  
 Figure 1: Development in the Norwegian Fund Market in Sample Period. 
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somewhat differently, hence, the other interest funds showing in the figure. Since 2008, AUM 
has grown with 314%. This is caused by two factors, namely the underlying value creation of 
securities and the increased inflow to funds. 
Figure 2 shows the allocation of total AUM into the different fund types (Statistics Norway, 
2015). 
Figure 2: Allocation of the total fund market based on AUM 
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Figure 3: Allocation amongst equity funds provided in Norway. 
 
A substantial amount of AUM is placed in funds that invest in international stocks. Investing 
worldwide is more common now as this enables better diversification considering the small 
market in Norway. Equity funds account for 429 billion NOK of the total AUM, whereas 
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total fund market in Norway.  
2.3 The Different Types of Mutual Funds 
Equity funds 
Equity funds are, as the name imply, funds that invest primarily in equity. The Norwegian 
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down the investment universe. This should reflect the manager's skill and specialization 
towards a given market. Geography, style and sector, or a combination of these, delimits a 
fund's investment universe. In this thesis, we will look at funds delimited by region, namely 
Norwegian equity funds. To be classified as a Norwegian fund it has to invest more than 80% 
of its assets in the Norwegian stock market and have Norway as its domicile.2 
Money Market Funds 
Money market funds invest solely in short-term securities. The standard is fixed-income 
securities with maturity of less than a year, mostly treasury bills. This type of saving have low 
risk, and will thus yield low returns. Money market funds are measured against a benchmark 
and split into groups based on the interest rate sensitivity to the benchmark. In addition, funds 
are ranked by credit risk (Bodie, 2014). A typical benchmark in Norway is the Norway 
Government Bond 0.25Y (ST1X).  
Fixed-Income Funds 
Fixed-income or bond funds are similar to money market funds in the way that capital is 
invested in fixed-income securities. However, the maturity of the investments varies. The most 
important difference is the risk involved due to interest rate sensitivity. Therefore, their 
expected return is also higher over time. There are several types of bonds to invest in such as 
government and corporate debt with different credit rating. If the interest rate goes up, the 
value of the funds go down and vice versa (Bodie, 2014).Norway Government Bond 3Y 
(ST4X) is a common benchmark for fixed-income funds in Norway. 
Other Funds 
Balanced funds have an objective to provide a mixture of safety and expected return. The 
strategy is to invest in a combination of equity and fixed income. The weighting will vary from 
fund to fund according to the fund's risk profile. A benchmark for balanced funds is usually 
composed of several indexes weighted according to the investment philosophy. Specialized 
sector funds concentrate on investments in a particular industry such as technology, utilities 
or telecommunications. International and regional funds are classified based on their 
investment universe. Regional funds concentrate on a particular part of the world, emerging 
                                                          
2 Verdipapirfondenes Forening -  http://tinyurl.com/zzfncjs 
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market funds invest in companies in developing countries and global funds invest worldwide 
(Bodie, 2014). 
 
Index Funds 
These funds try to match the performance of a broad market index (benchmark). The fund tries 
to hold a portfolio of securities in proportion to the security representation in that index. By 
doing so, the expected return should be close to the index. Index funds represent the market 
and should harvest the market risk premium. In Norway, a typical equity index fund provided 
by an investment company tries to mimic the main index known as OSEBX, which consists 
of a representative selection of all stocks listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange.  
2.4  Mutual Fund Management 
Mutual funds are managed in line with their prospectus. There are two main categories of 
mutual fund management: active management and passive management. The latter should be 
the cheaper alternative while actively managed funds often charge higher fees due to costs of 
more thorough market analysis.  
Passive Management 
The goal of passive management is to achieve the same return and risk as a benchmark. Thus, 
the fund's portfolio must consist of the same securities, and with the same proportion, as the 
benchmark. The most used benchmarks for Norwegian equity funds are the Oslo Stock 
Exchange Benchmark Index (OSEBX) and the Oslo Stock Exchange Mutual Fund Index 
(OSEFX). Passive funds are often referred to as index funds.  
An example of a passive fund is DNB Norge Index. Its prospectus states: 
"DNB Norge Index is an index fund with a passive investment strategy where the goal is to 
mimic the Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index' portfolio and return as closely as possible. 
There will not be attempted to achieve a higher return for the fund than the OSEBX-index." 
(Morningstar, (2015)) 
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The advantage of passive management compared to active management is the fee level. Fees 
should be lower due to the limited resources needed to analyse the market. The main 
counterargument is the possibility of missing excess returns due to mispricing. However, 
mispricing is a question of whether markets are efficient or not. We will comment further on 
this in chapter 3.  
Active management 
The goal of active management is to achieve returns in excess of a benchmark. There are two 
main methods of active management. Active fund managers look for mispricing in the market, 
and trade based on their analysis of which sectors or companies are over (undervalued). This 
is known as alpha-bets or stock picking. The second way to beat the market is to change the 
exposure to the market by holding a low (high) beta portfolio when you believe the market 
will fall (rise). This is known as tactical allocation, beta-bets or timing (Døskeland, 2015) 
Active management requires that you have superior information about certain companies, 
sectors or the market in general compared to competitors. This is time-consuming and costly, 
but the best fund managers should be able to achieve positive alpha. If not, no investor would 
incur the costs of active management.  
An example of an actively managed fund is DNB Norge Selektiv (I). The fund's investment 
philosophy is: 
DNB Norge Selektiv have an active investment strategy where the target is to achieve excess 
returns over the OSEBX. The fund managers has great freedom to make active shifts against 
the companies they believe has the greatest potential for value creation (Morningstar,  
(2015)). 
The benefit of active management is the potential excess return while the drawback is the 
higher fees and the incremental risk.  
Fee Structure 
When choosing a mutual fund, an investor should not only consider the investment policy and 
past performance, but also the management fees and other expenses. The fees each funds 
charge is stated in the prospectus. There are in general four classes of fees to be aware of. 
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The first type of cost is operating expenses, which is the cost incurred from operating the 
portfolio, including an advisory fee to the manager, and administrative expenses. These 
expenses are usually a percentage of total asset under management, and may range from 
typically 0.2% to 2%. The expenses are deducted from the assets of the fund. The second type 
of cost is the front-end load, which is charged when purchasing the shares. It might be as high 
as 6%, but has in recent years decreased or vanished due to increased competition in the 
Norwegian fund market. The third type of cost is back-end load or deferred sales charge. This 
fee incurs when you sell your shares. This might be up to 6% and is often reduced by 1 
percentage point for every year the funds are left invested.  Many Norwegian funds have no 
back-end load due to competition. In addition, funds may claim a performance fee triggered 
when reaching a certain point of positive return (Bodie, 2014). 
This section has introduced the mutual funds and the mutual fund market in Norway. Further, 
we will present finance theory that will add on the foundation needed to comprehend our study. 
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3. Theory 
In this chapter, we introduce the fundamental theory necessary to understand the work we do. 
First, we look at different perspectives of return, before we introduce the basis of linear 
regression. In particular, we elaborate on the coefficient of determination (R2) as this is the 
measure of active management in our thesis. Having the linear regression as a foundation, we 
visit the essential theory on the capital asset pricing model, the single-factor model and the 
multifactor model. Then we explain different measures of active management and introduce 
the efficient market hypothesis. A theory needed to understand the potential value of active 
management. Lastly, we define when a fund is active. 
3.1 Returns 
When calculating the average rate of return, there are two main methods; arithmetic returns 
and geometric returns. Which one to use depends on the calculations one wishes to conduct. 
Arithmetic average: 
?̅? =  
1
𝑛 ∑ 𝑟(𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Here the arithmetic average is represented by 𝑟. Each period return is represented by r(i), and 
each observation is equally weighted. The formula tells us that the arithmetic average is the 
sum of all returns divided on the number of observations (n). This method is used when dealing 
with independent events and when calculating expected returns. The arithmetic average 
provides an unbiased estimate of the expected future return.  
Geometric average: 
𝐺𝑒𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  (∏(1 + 𝑟𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
)
1
𝑛
− 1 
Geometric average return or time-weighted average return considers compounding and is 
often used as a metric when conveying return performance of investments. It also considers 
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that negative returns should be weighted more than positive. I.e. a 50% loss on a 100 NOK 
investment require a 100% gain in next period to compensate. Because of this, the geometric 
return will usually be lower than the arithmetic.  
Excess return 
Excess return is often referred to as the rate of return above that of a risk-free investment. 
Nevertheless, it can also be used as the rate of return over a comparable investment or 
benchmark. Unless otherwise stated excess return refers to returns above benchmark in this 
thesis. 
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑏 
where ri is the return of an investment or fund and rb is the return of a benchmark. Excess 
return is an important metric within the field of performance evaluation. However, excess 
return is not a good standalone measure of performance, as it does not reveal the additional 
risk taken to obtain this superior rate of return.  
Risk-adjusted return 
When considering returns one should always consider the amount of risk taken. Measuring 
performance based on excess return alone is not useful. Different investment styles induce 
varying levels of risk. This implies that managers should not be awarded for high returns if 
this is a result of excessive risk taking. Several measures of risk-adjusted returns exist, such 
as Sharpe ratio, Treynor's measure and Jensen's alpha (Bodie, 2014). The measure of risk-
adjusted return in this thesis will be the intercept of the regression model, which we will denote 
as alpha (α). Alpha is the average return of the fund not predicted by a benchmark model, 
given the funds exposure to well-known risk factors included in the benchmark model. By 
using alpha, we are able to consider risk and we can fairly compare funds' performance with 
each other. We will further explain alpha and its relation to the regression model in the 
following section. 
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3.2 Linear Regression 
Linear regression analysis is a technique with linear parameters, where the dependent variable 
(explained variable) is a function of independent variables (explanatory variables), plus an 
error term. Multiple regression is a regression model with more than one explanatory variable 
that may affect the dependent variable. The general linear regression model can be written as 
follows: 
𝑌 = 𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑋1 +  𝛽2𝑋2 +  𝛽𝑖  𝑋𝑖 +  …  +  𝜀𝑡 
where, 
Y = the dependent (explained) variable 
Xi = the independent (explanatory) variables 
Β0 = the intercept. It represents the average value of Y when X2 and X3 are set equal to 
zero, also known as alpha (α) 
Β1 = partial slope coefficient. Measures the change in the mean value of Y, E(Y), per unit 
change in X1, holding X2 constant 
B2 = partial slope coefficient. Measures the change in the mean value of Y, E(Y), per unit 
change in X2, holding X1 constant 
ε = the stochastic disturbance term which captures all factors that X misses that influences Y 
The goal of the regression model is to estimate the relationship between Y and Xi. To define 
the relationship we need a way to estimate the coefficients (βi). One of the most used methods, 
which we use, is the Ordinary least squares. 
3.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares 
Ordinary least squares (OLS) is the method most frequently used to estimate a sample 
regression function. The goal of OLS is to fit a function with the data as closely as possible. It 
does so by minimizing the sum of the squared residuals from the data. The method involves 
taking the squared vertical distance from an observation to the estimated line and minimize 
15 
 
  
Variation in yi 
explained by X(=?̂?) 
the sum of these squares. If 𝑦𝑡 is the actual data point for observation t, and ?̂?t is the estimated 
point on the regression line. Then the value 𝑥𝑡,?̂?t is the value for y the model will predict. In 
addition, we let 𝜀?̂? be the residual, which is the distance from the actual observation y and the 
estimates value ?̂? on the regression line. For a detailed explanation of OLS, we refer to 
Essentials of Econometrics (2010). 
3.2.2 Coefficient of Determination (R2) 
In our thesis, the coefficient of determination (R2, read as r squared) is an important measure 
so we will dedicate some time to explain and understand it. R2 is computed by measuring the 
distance from the actual data point observation and the mean and predicted value of those 
observations. A high R2 score is achieved if the squared distance between the actual 
observation and the mean is close to the squared distance between the predicted value and the 
mean. This is easily described in the equation below.  We denote the actual observation 𝑦𝑖, the 
mean is ?̅? and the regression model’s predicted value is ?̂?𝑖.  
(𝑦𝑖 + ?̅?)      =      (?̂?𝑖 + ?̅?)      +      (𝑦𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖) 
 
Notice that the last part of this equation is the same as the error term of the regression model, 
denoted 𝜀𝑖. In order to detect the absolute variations for all X values, each part of the above 
equation is summed and squared. This can also be written as: 
𝑇𝑆𝑆 = 𝐸𝑆𝑆 + 𝑅𝑆𝑆 
Where TSS is the total sum of squares, ESS is the explained sum of squares and RSS is the 
residual sum of squares. As we can see the sum of ESS and RSS result in TSS, thus if RSS 
(the error term) takes on a small value then ESS explains the TSS well. This again will lead to 
a high R2 value. To further illustrate this consider Figure 4: 
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Figure 4: Sum of squares 
 
 
This relationship is described mathematically here:  
𝑅2 = 1 −
𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑆𝑆 = 1 − 
∑(𝑦𝑖 − ?̂?)2
∑(𝑦𝑖 − ?̅?)2
 
Where, 
𝑦𝑖  = observed value 
?̂?𝑖 = predicted value 
?̅? = mean of the observed data 
From this equation, we can see that R2 may be looked at as the percentage number of how well 
the regression model explains the true variations in the observed data. Hence, an R2 value of 
1 indicates that the model describe the actual variations perfect, or that an R2 value of 0.5 
indicate that the model only explains 50% of the true variation.   
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3.3 CAPM, Single-Factor and Multi-Factor Model 
With the statistical foundation in place, we now move on by applying finance theory to the 
regression model. 
Many recognize the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) as the number one asset-pricing 
model. This is in particular due to its simplicity and not necessarily grounded in its accuracy. 
Treynor, Sharpe, Lintner and, Mossin introduced the CAPM in the 60’s and it is based on the 
work of Harry Markowitz in the field of modern portfolio management, where diversification 
is a key element. CAPM describe the pricing of stocks through a risk-free investment (𝑟𝑓) and 
the market premium (𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓) multiplied with that specific security’s sensitivity to the 
market portfolio, represented by beta (𝛽). 
𝐸(𝑟𝑖) = 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑖[𝐸(𝑟𝑚) − 𝑟𝑓] 
CAPM is an economic, equilibrium–based model intended to calculate the expected returns. 
Opposed to the single-index model, which is a statistical model of security returns. The single-
factor model assumes that stocks have a tendency to move in tandem, driven by the same 
economic forces and thus, can be described by one factor. This factor is in most cases a broad 
market index (this thesis uses OSEFX as a market factor proxy). Symbolically it is similar to 
the CAPM as we can see below. 
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑟𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝜀𝑖 
The individual stock sensitivity to market fluctuations is absorbed in the single-index beta (β). 
While the return not described by the model is captured by the models alpha (α). This is the 
metric used to describe risk-adjusted return in this thesis. Idiosyncratic risk is represented 
through the residual term epsilon (ε). Epsilon has an assumed normal distribution and a mean 
of zero and is, therefore, diversifiable. The total risk of an asset is described as: 
𝜎𝑖2 = 𝛽𝑖2𝜎𝑚2 + 𝜎2[𝜀𝑖] ,  
What we can see from this equation, with epsilon having a mean of zero, is that as we increase 
the number of assets in our portfolio the total risk (𝜎𝑖2) is emerging towards beta times the 
market risk (𝜎𝑚2 ). Thus, leaving us with only systematic risk (𝛽𝑖2𝜎𝑚2 ). 
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In 1992, Eugene Fama and Kenneth French (1992) published a study where they observed 
deviation in returns in stocks with different characteristics on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE), Amex and NASDAQ. This study, provoked by the observation of several empirical 
contradictions of the Treynor-Sharpe-Lintner-Mossin Capital Asset Pricing Model, identified 
stock characteristics that could more accurately describe a security’s expected return. The 
1992 study culminated in the well-known Fama-French Three-Factor Model (FF3F). The 
factors in the multi-factor model are based on factors that have earned premium returns over 
long periods, reflecting exposure to systematic risk and are grounded in the academic literature 
(Bender et al., 2013). 
Inspired by Rolf W. Banz’s (1980) earlier findings regarding the size effect, they developed a 
factor called Small-minus-big (SMB). Banz found that market capitalisation adds to the 
explanation of the cross-section of average returns provided by markets beta. Average returns 
on small market capitalisation stocks are too high given their beta estimates, and average 
returns on large market cap stock are too low.  
The second factor, High-Minus-Low (HML), was inspired by Dennis Stattman (1980) and 
Barr Rosenberg, Kenneth Reid and Ronald Lanstein (1985). This factor uses book-to-market 
ratio and its relationship to abnormal returns compared to returns predicted by the CAPM. In 
greater detail it captures excess returns to stocks that have low market value compared to their 
fundamental value, often identified through their book-to-market ratio, hence the name value 
factor. These two factors in addition to the market factor (𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) constitute the Fama-French 
Three Factor Model, as shown below: 
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑚(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
In a study on mutual fund performance, Carhart (1997) expanded the FF3F to a Four-Factor 
Model by including momentum as an additional explanatory variable. The additional factor is 
named UMD in our model and is based on the tendency of persistence in stock movement over 
time. With the new factor the model looks like this; 
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑟𝑓 + 𝛽𝑚(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
This is the main model used in this study to evaluate the funds exposure to well-known 
systematic risk factors and consequently their degree of active management. 
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3.4 Metrics of Active Management 
This section will introduce different metrics for active management used by practitioners and academician. We 
look at how they differ and assess their strength and weaknesses.  
3.4.1 R2 
R2 is a measure of the relationship between the variance in returns of a fund and the variance 
in returns of a benchmark. A high R2 indicate that the returns of the fund are highly correlated 
with the returns of the benchmark. Low R2 indicates little correlation between fund returns 
and benchmark returns. As discussed in section 3.2.2, the measure originates as the coefficient 
of determination from the analysis of variance method (ANOVA). Hereunder, we will explain 
R2 as a practical measure of active management rather than a statistical number. 
To illustrate R2 we use an example related to our thesis. Imagine we run a regression on the 
returns of fund X against the returns of the single-factor model, where we use OSEFX as the 
suitable market proxy. The regression gives us an R2 of 1. This means that all of fund X’s 
variation in returns can be explained by OSEFX's variation in returns. In other words, this 
implies that fund X and OSEFX have the same returns. Hence, fund X hold the same portfolio 
as OSEFX and can be characterized as an index fund. If R2 is 0.5, only 50% of fund X's 
variation in returns are explained by the OSEFX returns. This indicates that fund X deviates 
from the index and is an actively managed fund.  
We use the single-factor and four-factor model as models for estimation of R2 in this study. 
The risk factors serve as explanatory variables and the R2 (coefficient of determination) will 
indicate in what degree Norwegian mutual funds deviate from their benchmark and well-
known risk factors. Moreover, a high R2 indicates that the fund has low non-systematic risk 
(diversifiable risk), which means that the higher the value of R2, the better diversification and 
less active it is. A fund that diverge from its reference index (and risk factors) will yield a 
lower coefficient of determination. Thus, the fund is more active and less diversified. R2 is the 
preferred measure in this thesis due to its ability to absorb different types of risk (the four 
factors) and its simplicity. 
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3.4.2 Active Share  
Active Share is simply the percentage of the fund’s portfolio holdings that differs from the 
fund’s benchmark portfolio holdings. For an all-equity mutual fund that has no leverage or 
short positions, the Active Share of the fund will always be between 0% and 100% (Cremers 
and Petajisto, 2009). Symbolically it can be formulated like this; 
𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 =
1
2 ∑ |𝑊𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑖 − 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑖|
𝑁
𝑖=1
 
Where 𝑊𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑖 is the weight of stock i in the fund’s portfolio, 𝑊𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑖 is the weight of the 
same stock in the benchmark portfolio, and the sum is computed over all the stocks in the 
applicable investment universe. Thus, in order to calculate active share you need data on the 
portfolio composition of the fund and its benchmark, which may be hard to obtain. If you get 
hold of this data, it is most likely going to be quarterly single point-in-time data, meaning that 
the day of data extraction holdings may differ substantially from the “typical” holding of the 
fund. In addition, few data points require longer observations to spot trends. This issue 
advocates the use of simpler measure for activeness like the R2 measure used in this thesis. 
3.4.3 Tracking Error 
Tracking error (TE) can be described as the divergence between the return behaviour of a 
portfolio and the return behaviour of a benchmark. Contrary of what the name implies, high 
TE is not necessarily bad for an investor, as it only indicates variance of the difference in 
returns of a portfolio and a benchmark. Thus, a high TE could mean that your portfolio has 
outperformed the benchmark. Moreover, high TE indicates an active management strategy. 
Symbolically it can be noted as follows; 
𝑇𝐸 =  √(𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑝 − 𝑟𝑏) 
Where rp is the return of the fund portfolio and rb is the return of the benchmark. TE is usually 
reported as standard deviation, and is often a measure used to regulate or evaluate mutual 
funds degree of risk taking compared to their mandate. A portfolio manager would like to have 
a low TE in combination with a high excess return over the benchmark. This indicate that the 
manager is achieving good return with a minimum of extra risk.  
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3.5 Efficient Market Hypothesis 
To understand the dynamics of the formation of stock prices in the market we present the 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH). There is a close link between the EMH and the “random 
walk hypothesis” introduced by Eugene Fama (1965) in his Ph.D. thesis, “The Behaviour of 
Stock Market Prices” in 1965. Further on in 1970, in the paper “Efficient capital markets: A 
review of theory and empirical work” (Malkiel and Fama, 1970), he stated that “A market in 
which prices always “fully reflect” available information is called efficient”. In an 
aforementioned market, only new information will affect the price of an asset. By definition, 
new information is random, and we get the link to the random walk hypothesis. Fama further 
introduced three different forms of efficient markets, weak form-, semi-strong form- and 
strong form efficient markets.  
The weak-form hypothesis asserts that stock prices reflect all information derived by 
examining market trading data such as the history of past prices, trading volume, short interest, 
and so on. 
The semi-strong form hypothesis states that all public available information is reflected in the 
prices. Public information includes relevant information about the prospects of the company. 
Such information would be, in addition to past prices, fundamental data on the firm’s products, 
quality of management, balance sheet composition, earnings forecast, market position and so 
on. 
Finally, the strong-form version of the efficient market hypothesis states that stock prices 
reflect all information relevant to the firm, public or non-public. This version is quite extreme: 
e.g. few would argue that non-public inside information is sooner available to corporate 
officers at the firm than the markets participants.  
So what are the implications of the EMH and the prospects of excess return based on market 
analysis? Technical analysis is the search for recurrent and predictable patterns in stock prices. 
The efficient market hypothesis claims that all information regarding past prices is reflected 
in stock prices and technical analysis is, therefore, useless in the quest for excess returns. 
Fundamental analysis uses earnings and dividends prospects of the firm, expectations on future 
interest rates, and risk evaluations to determine the present value of the future cash flows 
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available to investors. If you observe that today’s stock price is below the present value of the 
future cash flows derived from your fundamental analysis, you believe the stock is under-
valued and that you should buy the stock. Again, the efficient market hypothesis predicts that 
most fundamental analysis would be pointless. The fundamental analysis is based on publicly 
available information, thus also available to rival analysts. It is unlikely that your analysis of 
a firm will be significantly different or more accurate than that of rival analysts. On that basis, 
EMH regards fundamental analysis as futile. In best case, your excess returns, as a result of a 
fundamental analysis, would be enough to cover your cost of information gathering, 
processing and implementation of the analysis conclusion.  
The EMH is the main argument for the proponents of passive portfolio management, mainly 
because of what is mentioned above. They believe that active management is largely a waste 
of resources and unlikely to justify the expenses that occur because of it. Therefore, they 
advocate a passive investment strategy that do no attempt to pick mispriced stocks. The 
strategy is rather to mimic a benchmark, and not try to find over- or undervalued stocks. A 
passive management is often characterised by a buy-and-hold strategy. Because the EMH 
indicates that stock prices are at fair levels, given all available information, it makes no sense 
to buy and sell frequently, which generates large transaction costs without increasing expected 
returns.  
On the other hand, we have the advocates of active portfolio management. Amongst their 
strong arguments, we find the “efficiency paradox”, introduced by Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980). If all information were reflected in market prices, market agents would have no 
incentive to acquire the information of which prices are based. This indicates that excess 
returns indeed are obtainable through an active management strategy. 
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Figure 5: The Grossman-Stiglitz Paradox 
 
 If no market participants engaged in information analysis, then stock prices would no longer 
reflect all information and this would open for profits to be made by conducting such activity. 
More and more market participants would participate in this activity until the profit of 
information gathering no longer surpass the cost of collecting the information, thus ending up 
in a market equilibrium, where the average investor generates only enough profit to cover his 
cost. A point where the marginal income of information gathering equals the marginal cost of 
that activity. This implies that the best analyst in the market would generate a significant profit 
through active stock picking while the poor ones would destroy value for their investors. 
3.6 Defining an Active Fund 
An active fund manager can attempt to generate excess return compared to its benchmark in 
two different ways: either by stock selection or by factor timing (or both). Stock selection 
involves picking individual stocks which the manager expects to outperform its peers. Factor 
timing involves time-varying bets on systematic risk factors such as entire industries, sectors 
of the economy, or more generally any systematic risk relative to the benchmark index. It is 
not clear how to quantify active management across all funds, as funds favour one approach 
over the other (Cremers and Petajisto, 2009). With this in mind, we need to define what an 
active fund is. If a fund manager loads heavily on a well-known risk factor, e.g. SMB, and 
 
Efficiency and information 
gathering activity in market Equilibrium: Semi-strong form 
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most of the excess return (over benchmark) can be explained by this exposure, should this be 
attributed to skill?  
In this thesis, we use a multi-factor model based on established risk factors as a benchmark 
model for evaluating funds' activeness and risk-adjusted returns. We believe that this a fair 
model as an investor could buy cheap exposure to well-known risk factors in indices, ETF’s 
etc. Hence, exposure to well-known risk factors may not be regarded as active management. 
In addition, multi-factor models are the preferred method when evaluating fund performance. 
Nevertheless, as we will comment later, these systematic factors do vary over time and 
exploiting them efficiently require managers to conduct analysis and evaluate when to load in 
these factors. Thus, some would argue that this indeed is active management. 
We now need to define when a fund is active based on our measure of activeness, R2. There 
is no recognized definition of an active fund, but many practitioners say that an active fund 
should not score an R2 over 0.90-0.95. As the Norwegian market is quite small, we believe 
that a 0.90 limit would be unfair. Because of the market size, there are fewer bets to do and 
the deviation from benchmark is harder to achieve without doing “unheard-of bets”. We define 
an active fund as a fund that has an R2 below 0.95. Further, in this thesis we define funds with 
R2 above 0.95 as “closet-indexers”. These funds charge fees as an active fund but barely 
deviates from their benchmarks.  
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4. Literature Review 
To excel our study, we spent considerable time on a thorough literature review, trying to 
investigate and understand the topic and previous results. There are a great number of studies 
on fund performance, whereas studies on R2 as performance indicator are not as widespread. 
We have delved into the world of literature attempting to excavate studies and research that 
are relevant for our study. Hereunder we present the essential works covering our topic. 
In 2013, Amihud and Goyenko (2013) conducted a study called, "Mutual fund’s R2 as 
predictor of performance". The authors use R2 to measure how active a fund is, and predict 
performance based on this measure. The study is conducted on US equity mutual funds in the 
period 1988-2010. Arguing that not all active mutual funds are equal, they believe in shifting 
the attention from active versus passive to further examining active management. Introducing 
R2 as an intuitive and easily calculable measure of active management, they differ from studies 
using fund holdings data. Amihud and Goyenko point out the applicability of their measure 
compared the measures using fund holdings data. They emphasize on R2's ability to pick up 
several risk factors, whilst measures using fund holding data struggles to define an accurate 
benchmark portfolio. The Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) model is the preferred 
model by Amihud and Goyenko, as the risk factors included are well documented and 
recognized. Applying an estimation period of 24 months and a test period of 1 month, they 
comply with findings on stock picking abilities and persistence. The result from their study is 
that R2 is a significant predictor of fund performance. They find that R2 is, with a negative 
coefficient, related to a positive alpha. Hence, management that is more active creates 
economic value. Sorting funds in each period into quintiles by R2 and alpha they find that the 
most active funds with the highest alpha generate a significant alpha of 3.8% in the following 
period. They unveil a pattern where decreasing R2 leads to higher returns. In addition, funds 
generating high alpha perform better than funds with low alpha in the subsequent period.  
Cremers et.al. (2015) do a comprehensive study on fund performance, including the method 
that Amihud and Goyenko use, with historical data from 2002-2007. Their sample consists of 
funds domiciled in 30 different countries from North America, Europe (including Norway) 
and Asia. The authors calculate R2 with a rolling window of 36 months, without justifications. 
In regards of four-factor alphas, they find that lower R2 do not indicate better performance. In 
addition, the study presents median fund R2 for each country. The median R2 in their sample 
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was 0.87, in comparison, the median in Norway was 0.89. It is noteworthy that their sample 
includes all equity funds and ETF's. The benchmark applied for Norwegian funds is the MSCI 
Norway TR. 
Titman and Tiu (2011) assess the same research question only with hedge funds. Looking at 
the period 1994-2005 in the US, they find that R2 is a predictor of performance. They find that 
hedge funds exhibiting lower R2's generates higher Sharpe ratios. That is higher return for a 
given level of risk.  
There are several studies using fund holdings data determining the relation between active 
management and returns. Brands et.al. (2005), Kacperczyk et.al. (2005), Cremers and Petajisto 
(2009) and Cremers et.al. (2015) are some of the leading papers on the subject. These studies 
claim that active management, measured by the difference in portfolio composition (the 
weights of the stock held in a portfolio) between a fund and a benchmark, increases fund 
performance.  
In Norway, Smørgrav and Næss (2011) and Post and Vethe (2012) both evaluate how active 
Norwegian funds are. Smørgrav and Næs measures active management with active share in 
the period 2003-2010. They find that almost 20% of Norwegian equity funds are "closet-
indexers". However, after a thorough investigation, we are not entirely convinced by these 
results. According to Petajisto (2013), funds with active share below 20% are pure index funds, 
and funds with active share between 20-40% are "closet-indexers". This implies that there are 
several more Norwegian funds in their study that should be categorized "closet-indexers" than 
Smørgrav and Næss states. They further show that the most active portfolio (high active share) 
generates 0.67% higher return than the least active portfolio (low active share), although 
insignificant. After reading their study, we observe no significant relationship between active 
management and performance. Post and Vethe look at the activeness of Norwegian equity 
funds in the period 1996-2011. They use R2 as their measure of active management and 
concludes that many Norwegian funds are "closet-indexers". More specifically, they unveil 
that around 190 000 investors own a "closet-index fund", which is quite a substantial amount 
regarding Norway's population of 5 million. 
Recently Sørensen (2010) executed one of the most comprehensive studies on fund 
performance in Norway. He constructs a sample of Norwegian equity funds from 1982-2010, 
including dead funds. Using the Fama-French and Carhart benchmark model, he finds no 
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evidence that active managed funds creates economic value to investors. He claims that alpha 
is indistinguishable from zero for active funds as a whole. Hence, actively managed funds 
have not outperformed the market (≈index funds). 
Using data from markets worldwide, Dyck et.al. (2011) evaluates the value of active 
management. In short, they state that active management depends on the efficiency of the 
underlying market and how sophisticated the investor is. Moreover, they say that active fund 
managers in the US underperform, but in emerging market they do create economic value. 
After a thorough review of existing empirical literature on active fund management and 
performance, we believe we have a sound understanding on the subject. Methodological issues 
are identified, and they will subsequently lay the basis for the methodology and data chapter.   
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5. Methodology 
In this chapter, we explain the models we use to answer our research questions. Specifically, 
we express the regression equations we use and explain the different premises we apply. The 
thesis has three research questions and we present each individually. Research question three 
uses panel data, thus we introduce the basics of this method. Ordinary least squares and panel 
data has several assumptions for generating correct and efficient estimates. Therefore, we 
present a section where we check our sample for the required assumptions. In addition, we 
show how we correct our sample for violations of these assumptions.  
5.1 Our Usage of the Methodology 
5.1.1 Research Question I 
We regress funds monthly excess returns (over one-month NIBOR rate) on the returns of two 
benchmark models. The first is the single-factor model expressed as 
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(OSEFX − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝜀𝑖. 
Secondly, we employ a factor mimicking portfolio benchmark, which we denote FFC, 
developed by Fama and French (1992) and Carhart (1997). This model uses the risk factors 
RM-Rf (market excess return, OSEFX-Rf), SMB (small-minus-big capitalisation stocks), HML 
(high-minus-low book-to-market ratio stocks) and UMD (preceding winner minus preceding 
loser stocks). The model is presented symbolically below: 
𝑟𝑖 − 𝑟𝑓 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑚(𝑅𝑚 − 𝑟𝑓) + 𝛽𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽𝐻𝑀𝐿𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖 
This regression provides an alpha (intercept of the regression) and R2 for each fund, as well as 
the risk factor coefficients. The risk factor coefficients allow us to attribute the differences in 
activeness to bets on well-known risk factors. From these results, we are able to analyse the 
activeness of funds based on R2 in comparison to our benchmark models. In addition, the alpha 
obtained gives an insight to the risk-adjusted returns for each fund. 
29 
 
  
5.1.2 Research Question II 
The main method used in research question 2 (RQII) is a rolling regression, where the actual 
regression model is identical to what we used in RQI.  The estimation window in the rolling 
regression is set to a period of twenty-four months, followed by a test period of one month.3 
In the estimation period, we regress monthly excess returns (over risk-free return) for each 
fund on the FFC model, moving the window one month at a time. Hence, the regression 
window will be 1-24, 2-25, 3-26 and so on.4 This regression gives us the alpha and R2 for each 
fund in every estimation period, which we then use to construct portfolios in the next period. 
As our research questions states, we explore a strategy that predicts fund performance based 
on funds lagged R2 (activeness) and alpha. First, we sort all funds into quartiles based on 𝑅𝑡−12  
in each month t. Second, within each quartile, we sort funds into four more quartiles by their 
𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑡−1. The latter we do because of Brown and Goetzmann (1995) earlier research of 
persistence in mutual fund performance. Each fund is equally weighted in their respective 
portfolios, this results in 16 (4x4) different portfolios.5 The returns of these constructed 
portfolios are then regressed on the FFC-model described earlier to retrieve the alpha for each 
portfolio. We then use the results from this regression to analyse the risk-adjusted returns of 
the aforementioned strategy.   
5.1.3 Research question III 
We apply panel data, known as longitudinal data in research question III. Panel data consists 
of time-series for each unit in the sample, such as firm, country or fund, over several periods.  
A key feature of panel data is that the same cross-sectional units are followed over a given 
period, and includes both a time series and a cross-sectional dimension. Benefits reaped from 
observing the same units over time is that we can control for unobserved characteristics of the 
units, and it often allows us to study the result of decision making. However, we cannot assume 
                                                          
3 The reason for the twenty-four month test period Busse (2005) findings that stock selection ability last a short period. In 
addition, Berk and Green’s (2004) suggest that superior performance in mutual funds cannot persist due to decreasing returns 
to scale caused by large inflows when performing well. 
4 A full range of observations (n=24) is required for a fund to run the regression 
5 The number of funds in each of the constructed portfolios may vary due to the number of funds in each month does not 
always divide by 16. 
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that the distribution of observations are independent across time or unit. Factors that affect one 
firm's return in one year might affect other firms return as well. We will further comment on 
how to deal with this later (5.2.4). For a detailed explanation of panel data, we refer to 
Microeconomics Using Stata (2010), chapter 8. 
Given the negatively skewed distribution of R2, with the majority of values close to 1.0, we 
use a logistically transformed R2. The transformed R2 is denoted TR2 and it is derived from 
the following equation:  
𝑇𝑅2 = 𝑙𝑛 [(√𝑅2 +
0.5
𝑛 )/ (1 −
√𝑅2 +
0.5
𝑛 )]  
Where 𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑗2  is the transformed R2 for each fund at time t, and n = sample size (24 months). 
This adjustment is first suggested by Cox (1970) and applied by Amihud & Goyenko (2013). 
It results in a more symmetric value than the raw R2 provides. We regress TR2 on lagged fund 
characteristics to examine if there is a relationship between fund characteristics and activeness. 
The characteristics we look at are operational expenses (fees), fund size, fund age and manager 
tenure. All explanatory variables are log transformed except fees. This provides the best 
distribution of the variables observations. Turnover is omitted due to missing data. In RQII R2 
is estimated over 24 months, hence we use nine non-overlapping periods of 24 months from 
1996-2014. All fund characteristics are end of year before the start of the 24-month estimation 
period. The regression model described is expressed symbolically below: 
𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2ln (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(ln (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒))𝑖,𝑡−12 + 𝛽4ln (𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5ln (𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑦𝑛𝑡9𝑛−1 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡, 
where i=entity and t=time, 𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝛽1−5 represents the coefficients for the 
independent variables (fund characteristics), y is the coefficient of the style dummies and ε is 
the error term. Standard errors are clustered by fund. 
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5.2 Fulfillment of Regression Assumptions 
In order to obtain the best estimate from the regression model, certain assumptions must be 
met. That is linearity in parameters, the error term is statistically independent, the expected 
mean of the error term is zero, homoscedasticity, no autocorrelation and no exact collinearity. 
A detailed explanation of these assumptions is presented in Appendix 1. In this subsection, we 
are looking at our data sample concerning if it fulfil these assumptions.  
5.2.1 Normality of the Error Term 
We execute the Ryan-Joiner test on our variables to check if the error terms of the returns are 
normally distributed. The null hypothesis (H0) of the test is that the sample is normally 
distributed, meaning that a p-value less than a given significance level rejects the hypothesis 
that the data tested is from a normally distributed population. As seen in Appendix 2, the p-
values of the Ryan-Joiner test on the sample of funds are presented. Only 7% of the funds 
satisfy the H0 of the test and thus indicate that the error terms in our dataset are not normally 
distributed. We do not see this as a problem, as normality of the dependent variable residuals 
is not a prerequisite for obtaining robust output from our model (Gujarati, 2010). It is the 
following issues however, that will inflict with our analysis the most. 
5.2.2 Heteroscedasticity 
We ran the Breush-Pagan (B-P) test to test for Heteroscedasticity. The reason for this is that 
the B-P test checks for the linear form of heteroscedasticity, which suits our data well 
(Gujarati, 2010). Symbolically we can describe heteroscedasticity as follows: 
𝐸(𝜀𝑖2) = 𝜎𝑖2 
Where the subscript i indicate that the variance of εi is no longer constant, but varies from 
observation to observation.  
The results from the B-P test indicate that 64 % of our sample is heteroscedastic (Appendix 
2). As a remedial measure, we use Newey-West (1987) corrected standard errors.  
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5.2.3 Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation can be viewed as “correlation between members of observations ordered in 
time” (Kendall, 1971). The theory of mean-reversion in stock returns, leads us to expect 
negative autocorrelation in our dataset. However, we find that our dataset generally does not 
indicate autocorrelation. To identify autocorrelation we have used the well-recognized 
Durbin-Watson test and the result is displayed in Appendix 2. 
The implications of autocorrelation in our dataset would be underestimating the true variances 
and SE, thereby inflating the t-values. This would give the impression of coefficients being 
statistically different from zero when in fact it might not be. Thus, if left uncorrected, an 
insignificant relationship can be mistakenly viewed as highly significant. This will affect both 
the assessment of risk-adjusted returns, as well as lead to an inaccurate level of R2. To adjust 
for any autocorrelation, we have as aforementioned used Newey-West (1987) corrected 
standard errors as done in Sørensen (2010). This method compensates for both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. Having checked and corrected for potential flaws in 
our method we are confident that the results from our study will be reliable and valid. 
5.2.4 Panel Data Assumptions 
When analysing panel data there are several different methods one could use, dependent on 
the sample. Since we have used OLS thus far, we thought of using pooled OLS on our panel 
data. We examined our dataset with the Lagrange multiplier test resulting in an exclusion of 
pooled OLS (see Appendix 3 for test results). We then ran the Hausman (1978) test to check 
whether to use fixed effects estimator or random effects estimator (Appendix 4). A 
shortcoming of the Hausman test is that it requires the random effects estimator to be efficient. 
That is, cluster robust standard errors should not differ substantially from default standard 
errors (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). Since this is the case in our sample, we ran a robust 
Hausman test described by Wooldridge (2011). After conducting this test, we ended up using 
the fixed effects estimator (see Appendix 5 for test results). Standard errors are clustered by 
fund. 
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6. Data 
To make sure our study is as comprehensive as possible we have spent considerable time and 
effort collecting and structuring our data sample. Whether the data is obtained accordingly is 
highly important for the soundness of our results. We use the highly trusted Morningstar Direct 
as our main source of data. In addition, we have used Børsprosjektet (NHH) as a 
supplementary source.  
6.1 Norwegian Equity Mutual Funds 
We obtain our data from Morningstar Direct, which has one of the most comprehensive 
databases on mutual funds in the world. Morningstar provides monthly net asset values 
(NAV), as well as fees, fund age, tenure, etc. The NAV assumes that all income and dividends 
are reinvested and are net of fees, but neglect front-end loads, deferred and redemption fees. 
In total, we obtain data for 59 actively managed open-end Norwegian equity mutual funds 
from January 1996 to December 2014. In addition, we collect data for six index funds for 
additional analysis. Asset management typically offers more than one fund, but we treat each 
fund as a separate unit. We include funds that have been terminated and incepted within our 
sample period, thus avoiding survivorship bias in our dataset. From the NAV we calculate 
monthly returns as follows: 
𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  
𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡
   𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
− 1 
where, 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑖,𝑡 is the net asset value of fund i at month t, and 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the return of fund i at month 
t. 
Furthermore, we have calculated the gross returns by backing out the most recent net expense 
ratio. We do this as a simulation of the returns investors would have received had they not 
paid any expenses. This is useful in our analysis to get a clear picture of whether or not R2 is 
a predictor of performance. Gross return is calculated as follows: 
𝑔𝑟𝑖,𝑡 =  
1+𝑟𝑖,𝑡
1 −  𝑒𝑟𝑖12
− 1 
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where, 𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is the net return for month i and 𝑒𝑟𝑖 is the expense ratio for the fiscal year that covers 
month i. This calculation assumes that the fees are determined based on monthly ending net 
assets. 
6.1.1 Criteria for Including Funds 
To conduct this study as thorough as possible, we need to ensure that our sample is consistent 
with the intention of the thesis. Morningstar categorizes funds according to their style, asset 
allocation, investment region etc. Hence, we have the following criteria for a fund to be 
included in our sample.  
● The fund is an open-end mutual fund 
● The fund domicile is Norway 
● The fund base currency is Norwegian kroner (NOK) 
● The fund asset allocation in equity is greater than 80% 
● The fund invests more than 80% of its assets in the Norwegian stock market  
From our research question, it is clear that we solely want to look at Norwegian funds that are 
publicly available. Further, we restrict the study to focus on investments in the stock market. 
This leads to including funds that have its domicile in Norway and invests at least 80% of its 
assets in Norwegian equity.6 We set the limit at 80% to ensure that funds holding cash 
positions or small investments in global stocks are included. It goes without saying that we 
exclude funds that primarily invest in bills, bonds, combination funds or other funds. By 
restricting the sample to funds that invest primarily in Norwegian equities, we will get more 
sound results as the benchmark we use will be more suitable. We have cleared our sample 
funds containing the word “index” or similar. In addition Morningstar sorts funds on their 
investment style, thus, we have removed funds with the same investment style as index funds. 
We will eventually expand our sample to include index funds to get an, even more, 
comprehensive study. 
                                                          
6 Also defined by the Norwegian Fund and Asset Management Association VFF. 2015. Standard for informasjon og 
klassifisering av aksje- og kombinasjonsfond [Online]. Available: http://vff.no/bransjestandarder [Accessed 18.12 2015]. 
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6.1.2 Survivorship Bias & Sample Period 
Survivorship bias in a sample can severely affect the results. That is if funds that are shut down 
or merged are excluded from the sample, an overestimation of the average performance may 
occur. This is due to the tendency that poorly performing funds are shut down. We include 
terminated and incepted funds within the sample period, thus avoiding survivorship bias in 
our dataset. 7  
Studies on the US mutual fund market, such as Brown et.al. (1992) and Brown and Goetzmann 
(1995), find that the survivorship bias is significant. On the Norwegian market, Sørensen 
(2010) provides evidence that surviving funds have outperformed dead funds. Kosowski et al. 
(2006) include only funds that have existed for five years in their analysis. This will increase 
the survivorship bias to some extent, by removing poorly performing funds. Fama and French 
(2010) omits funds that were not initiated five years before the end of their estimation period. 
Sørensen (2010) on the other hand includes all funds with at least one year of activity. He 
believes that including poorly performing and short-lived funds are important to achieve 
accurate and survivorship-bias free understanding of fund performance. Choosing of the 
sample period can be seen as a trade-off between applicable and relevant data and getting 
enough observations to obtain statistical significance. We choose to use a sample period from 
January 1996 to December 2014. Pre-1996 fund data is inadequate, and moreover, the 
Norwegian fund market were not mature. We believe this period is sufficient to achieve sound 
results as it includes both bull and bear markets.  
6.1.3 Adjustments to the Sample 
We adjust the sample such that we remove the first data point if a full month of daily returns 
is not available. This means that if a fund starts trading in the middle of a month, the first 
return is at the end of next month. Just like the first month, we adjust the last month in similar 
manner. We do this to avoid biased returns caused by not trading a full month. We exclude 
funds with less than 24 months of return, as this is the minimum observations needed to 
                                                          
7 No funds were excluded due to the 24-month estimation window, expect funds incepted less than 24 month prior to sample 
end date.  
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conduct our methodology.8 In the case of missing values, we calculated fictive NAV for the 
applicable months. We did this by calculating the average of the previous and next month. 
Funds missing more than two observations were excluded from our analysis. 
6.1.4 Fund Dataset Summary 
In total, our dataset comprises of 59 active funds and an additional 6 index funds. In the table 
presented in Appendix 6, we observe each fund and its lifespan, number of observations, asset 
under management (AUM) and operating fees. The numbers of observations for the funds 
range from minimum 37 to maximum 228. The majority of funds have 180 (mean of 183) 
observations or more which provide a solid sample. The largest fund in terms of AUM is DNB 
Norge with NOK 8.93 billion while the smallest fund is FORTE Norge with NOK 19 million. 
The average AUM is 1.7 billion. With regards to fees, the highest operating expense in our 
sample is 2.27% charged by Eika SMB, with a fee mean of 1.43%. Storebrand Norge 
Institusjon (0.2%) charges the lowest operating expense, due to the minimum deposit of 100 
million NOK.  
Because of our survivorship-bias free dataset, we include incepted funds and funds that are 
liquidated or merged during our analysis period. Hence, our dataset will vary in number of 
funds and observations as seen in table 2. The second column in the table below reports the 
number of funds existing each year. The third (fourth) column reports the number of funds 
incepted (liquidated or merged) each year. The last two years do not include any incepted 
funds because of our requirement of a 24-month estimation period. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 24 months is the minimum amount of observations needed to conduct our rolling regression. 
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Table 2: Sample size through sample period 
 Number of funds 
Year End of year Incepted Liquidated 
1996 28 4 0 
1997 31 3 0 
1998 38 7 0 
1999 39 1 0 
2000 42 3 0 
2001 46 4 0 
2002 51 5 0 
2003 53 2 0 
2004 54 1 0 
2005 55 1 0 
2006 54 2 3 
2007 53 0 1 
2008 53 0 0 
2009 53 0 0 
2010 53 0 0 
2011 55 2 0 
2012 54 0 1 
2013 51 0 3 
2014 44 0 7 
 
6.2 Benchmark Models 
In our analysis, we use both the single-factor model and the Fama-French and Carhart four-
factor model as benchmark models. Hereunder, we present our choice of factors and their 
sources. 
6.2.1 Market Return 
In order to capture the activeness and risk-adjusted returns of each fund the best way possible, 
we need to find an appropriate benchmark. Each fund states in its prospectus what their defined 
benchmark is. The main question is which proxy for market return we should use to capture 
the market as a risk factor. The benchmark should be as broad as possible and capture the 
return in the applicable investment universe.  
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The Norwegian Fund and Asset Management Association set certain requirements for a 
benchmark. These include such as, the benchmark must be possible to invest in, well-defined, 
observable and has the same risk- and investment profile as the fund. However, the most 
important requirement is that the benchmark and the fund are based in the same investment 
universe. 9  
Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) provides several indexes that could be suitable when studying 
Norwegian funds. I.e. sector-specific indexes such as OSE10 Energy and OSE35 Health Care. 
With a more global perspective, the MSCI World Index or MSCI Nordic Index are applicable. 
In our case the most fitting ones are: 
• OSEAX – Oslo Stock Exchange All Share Index includes all stocks on Oslo Stock 
Exchange. 
• OSEBX – Oslo Stock Exchange Benchmark Index includes most traded shares listed 
on Oslo Stock Exchange. Often referred to as “The main index”. 
• OSEFX – Oslo Stock Exchange Mutual Fund Index is a capped version of OSEBX. 
 
Most funds state OSEFX as their benchmark and Morningstar use OSEFX as their universal 
benchmark for Norwegian funds. The OSEFX is a capped version of the Oslo Stock Exchange 
Benchmark Index (OSEBX). The capping rules comply with the UCITS (Undertakings for 
Collective Investment in Transferable Securities) directives for regulating investments in 
mutual funds. The maximum weight of a security is 10% of total market value of index and 
securities exceeding 5% must not combined exceed 40%.10 To achieve the best basis of 
comparison we use the same benchmark for all funds in the sample. We determined our 
benchmark’s market proxy by testing different indices on our sample. We found that OSEFX 
achieved the highest overall R2, and thus, is the best fit for our dataset. This method of 
benchmark selection is in line with Petajisto & Cremers (2009). The choice of benchmark will 
                                                          
9http://vff.no/assets/Bransjenormer/Bransjeanbefalinger/Bransjeanbefaling-kriterier-for-valg-av-referanseindekser-for- 
aksjefond.pdf 
10 http://www.oslobors.no/markedsaktivitet/#/details/OSEFX.OSE/overview 
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affect the results of our study, but because of the aforementioned the OSEFX will provide the 
most trustworthy results.  
6.2.2 Risk-Free Rate and Risk Factors  
We construct monthly excess return for each of the funds and the market returns by deducting 
the one-month risk-free proxy from the returns. This is an estimate of one-month risk-free rate 
based on NIBOR, acquired from Professor Bernt Arne Ødegaard’s website. 11 The time-series 
of monthly returns for the remaining factors of Fama-French and Carhart, that is the size-, 
book-to-market - and momentum factor, are also gathered from Ødegaard’s website. 
Ødegaard's data is a well-known source on Norwegian stock market data and used by several 
studies on Norwegian mutual funds. Ødegaard constructs these risk factors for OSE in the 
same way as French does for the US stock market. 12 The size factor (SMB) is the returns of a 
portfolio that take a long position in small companies and a short position in large companies.  
The book-to-market factor (HML) is the returns of a portfolio that have a long position in 
companies with high book-to-market value and a short position in companies with low book-
to-market value. The momentum factor (UMD) factor is a portfolio that is long in winners and 
short in losers from the previous year.  
6.2.3 Summary Statistics 
In the figure below, we have plotted the returns of all the funds in our sample, the index funds 
(≈OSEBX) and the dead funds. This illustrates the survivorship bias that would have been 
present if we had excluded the terminated funds. The returns of the dead funds have been 
substantially lower than the returns of an equally weighted portfolio of all funds. 
                                                          
11 ØDEGAARD, B. A. Asset pricing data at OSE [Online]. Available: 
http://finance.bi.no/~bernt/financial_data/ose_asset_pricing_data/index.html [Accessed]. 
12 FRENCH, K. R. Current research returns [Online]. Available: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html [Accessed 18.12 2015]. 
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Figure 6: Illustration of survivorship bias 
 
Accumulated returns for all fund and dead funds, compared with index return 
In 2008, Næs et.al (2011) published a paper on known systematic risk factors on OSE. This 
research concludes with SMB and stock liquidity factor (LIQ) being present on OSE. Further, 
they claim that HML and UMD do not demand risk compensation, and is therefore not relevant 
for the Norwegian stock market. However, as stated by the Næs et.al. (2011), the reliability of 
these results are highly sensitive to the sample period. Therefore, we choose to use the FFC 
model as it is a common benchmark model in studies on fund performance, and also applied 
by Amihud and Goyenko (2013).  
In the table below, we present the different return vectors. Mrkt is the market return (given by 
the OSEFX) excess of the risk-free rate (the 1-month proxy). SMB and HML are returns of 
the factor mimicking portfolios for size and book-to-market equity of Fama and French. UMD 
is the factor-mimicking portfolio for one-year return momentum. Column two reports yearly 
average return of the four portfolios. The third column reports the standard deviation of the 
return per year for each portfolio. Column four to seven reports the correlations between the 
factor portfolios. 
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Table 3: Yearly average factor returns and SD and correlation matrix 
Risk Factor Yearly Average Return Standard Deviations 
Correlations 
Rm SMB HML UMD 
Mrkt 8.63% 22.58% 1.00    
SMB 6.91% 13.72% -0.48 1.00   
HML -1.96% 15.71% -0.20 -0.04 1.00  
UMD 9.58% 19.37% -0.13 0.13 -0.08 1.00 
 
As we see from table 3, all factors except HML have quite high returns. The correlation 
between the factors are also relatively small which indicates that they do not capture the same 
risk. 
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7. Results 
In this chapter, we present, comment and interpret our empirical results. We present the results 
separated into subsections based on research question I, II and III. In subsection one, we look 
at the degree of active management in Norway in the period under investigation. Then, in 
subsection two, we examine an investment strategy based on our measure of active 
management. Lastly, we investigate if we can identify fund characteristics effect on active 
management. 
7.1 How Active are Norwegian Funds? 
We start by addressing how active Norwegian equity mutual funds have been from 1996 to 
2014. We use R2 as a measure of active management and apply a four-factor model presented 
in chapter 5.1.1. The model includes the risk factors market return, SMB, HML and UMD. 
We do this to ensure conformity to similar studies. Second, to validate our result, we employ 
tracking error to measure active management. Furthermore, we look at index funds R2 as a 
comparative basis in respect to the R2 of active funds and "closet-indexers".  Then, we consider 
fees and the degree of active management. Lastly, we compare our results with existing 
empirical literature. 
7.1.1 Examining Active Management Using R2 
To examine active management among Norwegian mutual funds, we apply our two benchmark 
models and use R2 as a measure of activeness. In the table below, we present the aggregate 
output from the time-series regressions of an equally weighted portfolio consisting of all funds 
in our sample. 
 
 
 
 
43 
 
  
Table 4: Aggregate Output 
Model R2 α Mrkt SMB HML UMD 
Single-Factor 0.914 2.98% 0.964    
  (3.30) (60.54)    
FFC 0.931 1.43% 0.999 0.141 -0.054 0.011 
   (1.83) (89.07) (7.75) (-3.78) (0.93) 
Aggregate output from the two regression models. The table shows results of an equally weighted portfolio of 
mutual fund returns regressed on the Single-factor model and the FFC four-factor model. Returns are gross of 
fees and alphas are annualized. R2 is the average obtained from individual fund regressions. T-values are 
corrected according to Newey-West. The sample period is Jan. 1996 - Dec.2014. 
 
We see that the average R2 is 0.914 when applying the single-factor model as the benchmark 
model. This number increases when we apply the four-factor model (FFC) resulting in an R2 
of 0.931. This means that on average about 7 % of the funds return variance is explained by 
something else than the risk factors in the FFC model. We see that all coefficients except the 
UMD are statistically significant. Norwegian fund manager’s seems to load their portfolios on 
the SMB factor indicated by the coefficient of 0.141. We also note that the risk-adjusted gross 
return declines from 2.98% (3.30) to 1.43% (1.83) when applying the four-factor model rather 
than the single-factor. Rerunning the analysis with net returns, the alphas drop to 1.44% (1.64) 
and -0.08% (-0.10) for the respective models. Hence, we cannot claim that Norwegian equity 
mutual funds create significant risk-adjusted returns to its investors. This is in line with 
previous studies on the Norwegian mutual fund market, e.g. Sørensen (2010). In Table 5: 
Individual Fund Output Using FFC Model we show the individual regression output for a 
selection of funds using the FFC model. 
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Table 5: Individual Fund Output Using FFC Model 
Rank/pctile Date Span R2 ri-rm α Mrkt SMB HML 
Most active 199601-201412 0.785 3.91% -0.53% 1.022 0.448 -0.244 
(Danske Inv. Vekst)    (-0.19) (25.24) (6.83) (-4.75) 
2 199601-201412 0.806 4.64% 0.99% 1.049 0.418 -0.463 
(Storebrand Vekst)    (0.34) (24.99) (6.16) (-8.69) 
3 199706-201412 0.825 0.23% -4.48% 1.045 0.523 -0.044 
(Nordea SMB)    (-1.83) (29.11) (8.99) (-0.97) 
10% 200104-201412 0.852 5.10% 1.51% 1.171 0.588 -0.082 
(DNB SMB)    (0.52) (27.90) (7.91) (-1.44) 
20% 199803-201412 0.873 3.64% 0.64% 1.08 0.201 -0.255 
(Atlas Norge)    (0.26) (31.02) (3.58) (-5.78) 
Median 199601-201412 0.953 4.17% 3.19% 0.967 0.014 -0.107 
(Carnegie AksjeNorge)    (2.64) (56.40) (0.50) (-4.92) 
80% 199601-201412 0.978 1.42% 1.46% 0.975 0.033 -0.008 
(Nordea Avkastning)    (1.82) (85.06) (1.77) (-0.56) 
90% 199601-201412 0.984 1.12% 1.38% 0.954 -0.032 0.012 
(DNB Norge)    (2.00) (97.01) (-2.01) (0.95) 
3 199601-201402 0.985 0.82% 1.26% 0.964 -0.009 0.005 
(DNB Norge Avanse I)    (0.30) (99.23) (-0.55) (0.43) 
2 199601-201402 0.985 1.85% 1.96% 0.959 -0.006 0.006 
(DNB Norge I)    (2.85) (99.90) (-0.37) (0.52) 
Least active 199601-201412 0.985 2.01% 1.55% 1.007 0.038 -0.015 
(Storebrand Norge)    (2.26) (103.16) (2.41) (-1.17) 
Average   0.931 2.16% 1.25% 0.994 0.124 -0.046 
The table shows individual fund and percentiles results employing the FFC model. Alphas are annualized. T-
values are corrected according to Newey-West (1987). Ri-rm is the annualized risk-neutral return. 
By running the regression for each fund individually, it is possible to assess the activeness of 
each fund in our sample. The momentum factor (UMD) is omitted from the table, as it is 
insignificant for almost all funds. It is reasonable to think that this factor is not relevant in the 
Norwegian market, rather than the managers choose not to utilize this risk factor. 
We find that the most active equity mutual fund in Norway from 1996-2014 has been Danske 
Invest Norge Vekst with an R2 of 0.785. Its yearly risk-adjusted return is equal to -0.53% (risk-
neutral yearly average return is 3.91%), though not significant. Then follows Storebrand Vekst 
and Nordea SMB with an R2 of 0.806 and 0.825. We observe that many of the most active 
funds take more market risk than the benchmark. We find from both this output and further 
investigation, that funds that are more active in general have a market coefficient above 1. 
Indicating that these funds take active positions when it comes to market timing. The opposite 
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is true for less active funds, which have a market coefficient similar to the index funds (as seen 
in Table 7). In addition, the more active funds load quite heavily on the SMB factor (most 
often significant). Whereas the average SMB coefficient is 0.124 for all funds, the most active 
half of our sample have an average coefficient of 0.224. Looking at the lowest R2 quartile, the 
average SMB loading is 0.300. The size and liquidity of the Norwegian stock market might be 
a rationale for this result. To explain this, imagine a stock market comprising of five stocks. 
Stock A, B and C are large companies, D is mid-size and E is small cap with low liquidity. 
Due to the aforementioned UCITS regulations of fund management (The maximum weight of 
a security is 10% of total market value of index and securities exceeding 5% must not 
combined exceed 40%), funds have limited allocation options toward the large companies (A, 
B and C). If the fund managers wish to deviate from the benchmark, they are forced to take 
positions in the smaller company. Consequently, managers that want to deviate from the 
benchmark will get a bias towards small cap stocks, i.e. the SMB factor. In larger markets 
(NYSE etc.), a fund will more easily be able to construct a concentrated portfolio composed 
of several larger companies and still achieve a low R2 score. As this section show, much of the 
proclaimed active management are accounted for by the SMB factor. As a consequence, 
loading in the SMB factor will not be ascribed to active management in our model.  
The median R2 score, here represented by Carnegie AksjeNorge, is 0.953. This means that half 
of the funds in our survivorship-bias free sample scores 0.953 or higher. This means that the 
FFC benchmark model explains 95% or more of the variation in returns for half of our sample 
of active funds. As discussed in section 3.6, a fund with an R2 over 0.95 is categorised as a 
"closet-indexer”. These findings indicate that several Norwegian equity funds are essentially 
passive funds. In Figure 7, we illustrate the skewness in distributions of R2 in our sample.  
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Figure 7: R2 Distribution of sample funds 
  
The histogram shows the number of funds within each R2 interval.  
We see that 50% of the Norwegian mutual funds have an R2 higher than 0.95. This is consistent 
with what Professor Amihud found in the US market. His study revealed that the median fund 
in the US market had an R2 of 93 %. "The great majority of funds are closet indexers," he says. 
"They tell you they are active funds and take your money but do something close to the index" 
(Wall Street Journal 2013 (Light, 2013)). A possible explanation for the lack of active 
management in Norway is found in Cremers et.al. (2015). They suggest that funds are more 
active when they face more competitive pressure from low-cost explicitly indexed funds. 
Hence, the low number of index funds in the Norwegian fund market might be an explanation 
of the scarcity of actively managed funds. 
The least active fund in our analysis is Storebrand Norge with an R2 of 0.985. This fund is 
creating an alpha of 2.55% (2.26), while not being especially loaded in any of the factors 
except the OSEFX. The competition for least active fund was quite hard as many funds scored 
just below 0.985. In general, the least active funds are not loaded in any particular degree 
towards the risk factors except the market. Since index funds represent a benchmark, they do 
not exploit the FFC risk factors in any particular degree. Therefore, it is natural that the least 
active funds are less exposed to the FFC factors.  
7.1.2 Active Management Measured by Tracking Error 
Due to the high share of “closet indexers”, we double check our results using tracking error 
(TE), introduced in section 3.4.3. TE and R2 are both measures of return variance. Our main 
model will absorb exploitation of the FFC factors and such positions will not be ascribed as 
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active management. Thus, potentially leading to higher R2 than a corresponding TE measure. 
However, we do not find significant distinction in the different methods’ result of activeness. 
The average TE for our sample is 6.52%, a number viewed by practitioners as low. In 
comparison, the index funds in our sample have a TE of 1.28%. As we sort all funds based on 
both R2 and TE, excluding one extreme value, a fund on average moves two places using 
absolute values when changing ranking from R2 to TE. This implies that the two different 
measures yield similar ranking of the funds concerning active management. More important 
it supports the fact that many Norwegian funds are "closet-indexers". As Table 6 shows, the 
different methods returns similar ranking of the funds in respect to their activeness/deviation 
to their benchmark. These findings support R2 as our measure of activeness and indicate that 
our findings are robust against a change in measurement method. 
Table 6: Active Management Ranking Based on R2 and TE 
Most Active       
Ranking Fund Name TE Fund Name R2 
1 StorebrandVekst 15.19% DanskeInvestNorgeVekst 0.785 
2 DanskeInvestNorgeVekst 13.76% StorebrandVekst 0.806 
3 GlobusAktivAcc 13.61% NordeaSMB 0.825 
4 GlobusNorgeIIAcc 13.36% ParetoAksjeNorgeA 0.846 
5 AlfredBergGambak 12.53% GlobusAktivAcc 0.851 
6 NordeaSMB 12.22% DNBSMB 0.852 
7 DNBSMB 12.02% ODINNorge 0.857 
Least Active       
53 DNBNorgeAvanseII 3.06% AlfredBergNorge 0.983 
54 DNBNorge 3.05% DNBNorge 0.984 
55 DNBNorgeIII 3.03% DNBNorgeIII 0.984 
56 DNBNorgeI 2.95% DNBNorgeIV 0.984 
57 StorebrandNorgeInstitusjon 2.92% DNBNorgeAvanseI 0.985 
58 DNBNorgeAvanseI 2.89% DNBNorgeI 0.985 
59 StorebrandNorge 2.86% StorebrandNorge 0.985 
Ranking funds from most active management to least active management according to the two 
measures. 
7.1.3 Risk Factors Influence on Active Management 
Figure 7 shows that the funds in our dataset are heavily skewed towards high R2. Half of the 
funds are located in the area R2 > 0.95. This observation supports the ongoing criticism of 
Norwegian funds, in that they barely deviate from their benchmark. Through this section, we 
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analyse if the actively managed funds utilize the known risk factors in their pursuit to beat 
their benchmark, and as a consequence of this, the four-factor model absorbs this strategy 
resulting in a high R2 and low alpha for these funds. 
In this analysis, we introduce true index funds and compare them with the funds in our sample. 
An index fund is by definition a fund that imitate the index, and consequently, should score 
an R2 close to 1.0. Index funds commonly charge low fees accordingly to its passive 
management. Hence, “closet-indexers” charging active management fees, might not be a 
worthwhile investment. 
Table 7: Loadings Active vs “Closet-Index” vs Index Fund. 
 Regression statistics 
Coefficients Active “Closet-Index” Index 
Market 1.024*** 0.975*** 0.977*** 
 (58.95) (67.21) (200.79) 
SMB 0.238*** 0.023* -0.001 
 (8.46) (1.71) (-0.24) 
HML -0.093*** -0.010 -0.003 
 (-4.22) (-0.92) (-0.64) 
UMD 0.007 0.011 0.001 
 (0.41) (1.35) (0.12) 
Alpha(annualized) 0.005 
 
 
0.015** -0.001 
 (0.38) (2.59) (-0.50) 
R2 0.888 0.972 0.997 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
R2 is an average of the individual funds R2 from the FFC-model. All other values is equally weighted returns 
regressed on the FFC-model. The benchmark for “active” and “closet-index” is OSEFX and the benchmark for 
“index” is OSEBX. 
  
The index portfolio consists of an equally weighted portfolio of the Norwegian index funds 
available in the Norwegian market (n=6). We use OSEBX as this is the benchmark identified 
by index fund providers. In addition, we find that this index matches the movement of index 
funds the best. This method is in line with the benchmark identification method used by 
Petajisto & Cremers (2009). The active portfolio is constructed by the funds in our sample 
with an R2-score less than 0.95 (n=29). The “closet-index” portfolio is an equally weighted 
portfolio of the fund in our sample that has an R2-score higher than 0.95 (n=30).  
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As expected, the index funds are not loaded at all against the FFC factors. The FFC coefficients 
of “closet-index” funds are also small, with SMB as a nearly insignificant exception.  We also 
observe that “closet-indexers” R2 is not far from that of the true index funds. This may indicate 
that “closet-indexers” do not deliver the active management their fees imply. This is in line 
with the Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway criticism of Norwegian funds that charge 
active management fees, but cannot document their effort to actively beat the benchmark.13  
 
If we then turn to the sample with low R2 funds, we see that they have a heavier loading on 
the market factor and SMB factor. The higher market loading indicates that these funds are 
taking beta bets, taking on more market risk and potentially achieving higher returns. The 
higher SMB factor may indicate that the funds are deviating from their benchmark through 
exploiting the tendency of small companies outperforming large companies. This tendency is 
widely known, and it is based on the fact that smaller companies carry more risk than larger 
companies do. Because of this, such loadings will not provide a risk-adjusted alpha. 
Alternatively, the loading on SMB might come because of the competition in gathering 
superior information. Actively managed funds might, on the background of the efficient 
market hypothesis and the cost-income equilibrium, concentrate their analysis on smaller 
companies with fewer analysts following them. This could potentially explain some of the 
higher loadings in the SMB-factor. In addition, we have the “small market” argument from 
section 7.1.1, that also implies that active funds are “forced” into an SMB factor bias. 
Table 8: Single-Factor Loading 
  Regression statistics 
Coefficients Active “Closet-Index” 
Market 0.963*** 0.968*** 
 (54.56) (141.22) 
Alpha(annualized) 0.026* 0.018*** 
 (1.77) (3.22) 
R2 0.857 0.970 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
R2 is an average of the individual funds R2 from the FFC-model. All other values is equally weighted 
returns regressed on the FFC-model. 
                                                          
13 http://www.finanstilsynet.no/no/Artikkelarkiv/Aktuelt/2015/2_kvartal/Aktiv-forvaltning-av-aksjefond--tematilsyn/ 
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It is intriguing to see that the single-factor model alpha is higher for funds with R2 < 0.95.This 
implies that active fund managers rely on the well-known risk factors to achieve higher returns.  
This may fool a naïve investor, in terms of higher absolute returns, but the risk-adjusted returns 
are lower. Active funds do not generate positive alpha when we adjust for the risk factors in 
our model. However, the "closet-indexers" do. This may indicate that “closet-indexers” have 
found the “secret sauce.” 
7.1.4 Fees and Active Management 
Discovering that much of the fund managers in our sample are relatively passive, we compare 
the degree of activeness with the fees associated with each fund. We introduce a new measure 
that we call value for money (VFM). This relates directly to active versus passive management. 
When charging higher fees, you expect the management to be active and potentially achieve 
risk-adjusted returns. The variable is a measure of the degree of active management you 
receive for the fee you pay, hence a higher value is better. VFM is calculated by the following 
formula: 
𝑉𝐹𝑀 =  
(1 −  𝑅2)
𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠
 
The formula is straightforward and does not weight either of its components in any way. 
Hence, it assumes a linear relationship between activeness and fees, which might not be 
accurate in real life. However, it gives a good indication of whether you get what you pay for, 
that is active management and the opportunity to achieve risk-adjusted returns. As  
 show there is a vast amount of funds that are charging fees from 1.50-2.00% and manages the 
fund like an index fund. On the contrary, among the top 10 funds, we observe efforts of actual 
active management, in reference to their R2 score. It is noteworthy that DNB has so many 
funds located in the lower part of the list. DNB is the fund provider that by far has most 
customers and accounts for a substantial part of the total amount invested in Norwegian funds. 
Why would anyone pay DNB 2% in yearly fees to manage the fund as an index fund, when 
they rather could buy an actual index fund with fees around 0.10%-0.30%? There is no 
guarantee that active management will yield higher returns. However, the managers should, at 
least, give the investors the opportunity of excess returns when charging "active fees".  We 
see that there are indications that fund managers deprive investors of this opportunity. Cremers 
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et. al.(2015) suggest that actively managed funds are more active and charge lower fees when 
they face more competition from true index funds. Hence, the lack of explicit index funds in 
Norway might be a reason for passive funds charging “active fees”.  We do not want to further 
speculate on this, but we encourage others to further enlighten the field of fund management 
and fee levels in Norway.  
Table 9: Active Management to fee 
Top 10                           
Fund Name 
Fee 
ratio 
R2 VFM Net α Bottom 10               
Fund Name 
Fee 
ratio 
R2 VFM Net α 
Pareto Aksje Nor I 0.50 0.859 0.28 1.96% RF Aksjefond Acc 2.00 0.967 0.02 -0.44% 
Globus Aktiv Acc 0.80 0.851 0.19 -6.40% Alfred Berg Nor 
Classic 
1.20 0.981 0.02 1.00% 
Atlas Norge 0.75 0.873 0.17 -1.03% DNB Nor (Avanse II) 1.20 0.982 0.02 -0.98% 
ODIN Norge II 0.90 0.861 0.15 -1.60% DNB Nor (III) 1.09 0.984 0.01 0.75% 
Pareto Investment 
Fund C 
0.50 0.938 0.12 1.28% Alfred Berg Nor Etisk 1.70 0.98 0.01 -0.75% 
Danske Inv. Nor 
Vekst 
1.75 0.785 0.12 -2.27% Nordea Avkastning 2.00 0.978 0.01 -0.56% 
Storebrand Vekst 2.00 0.806 0.10 -1.02% Storebrand Nor 1.50 0.985 0.01 0.02% 
Nordea SMB 2.00 0.825 0.09 -6.37% DNB Nor 1.80 0.984 0.01 -0.57% 
Pareto Aksje Nor A 1.84 0.846 0.08 -0.02% DNB Nor (I) 1.80 0.985 0.01 -0.01% 
DNB SMB 2.01 0.852 0.07 -0.00% DNB Nor (Avanse I) 1.81 0.985 0.01 -0.57% 
Alphas are net of fees. Alphas are almost exclusively insignificant. Institutional funds are not included as their 
fee level is incomparable to other funds due to a minimum investment of 100 million .VFM is the value for money 
metric.  
7.1.5 Comparison to Other Studies on Active Management 
Post and Vethe’s (2012) study support our findings. They conducted a similar study on the 
Norwegian market, which indicated that many of the most popular Norwegian funds are 
merely "closet-indexers". Smørgrav and Næss (2011) used Active share (AS) as their measure 
of activeness. They found that 20% of funds are classified as "closet-indexers" while another 
30% are close to being "closet-indexers". However, there are reasons to believe their findings 
are biased. Suppose a fund has the OSEFX as its stated benchmark and invests passively most 
of its assets in this index and the rest passively invested in the OSESX (Small Cap index), 
which on average outperforms the OSEFX. This fund will have a positive active share given 
that its portfolio deviates from its benchmark's portfolio (OSEFX), and hence it will be 
considered active, although it is in fact a passive indexer. On the other hand, R2 from a risk 
factor model will identify this indexing and its R2 will be closer to one. Thus, we believe 
Smørgrav and Næss are underestimating the number of "closet-indexers" and that our results 
are more descriptive of active management in the Norwegian fund market. 
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7.2 Picking Winners Based on Degree of Active Management 
Now we construct portfolios based on preceding R2 and alpha to see if fund activeness can 
predict risk-adjusted returns. The methodology used is explained thoroughly in chapter 5.1.2. 
Further, due to the two-sided profile of our fund sample, we do some adjustments to how many 
portfolios applied in the method. In addition, we conduct the same method using the single-
factor model. This will adjust for the effect of risk factor loading by active managers.  
7.2.1  Lagged R2 as a Predictor of Performance  
In this section, we examine if it is possible to use lagged R2 as a predictor of performance. We 
have in total 59 funds included in this analysis. The number of funds each year differentiates, 
depending on the number of funds existing each year. Hence, the 16 portfolios do not have the 
same amount of funds each period, but since this is an equally weighted portfolio, it will not 
be a problem for the analysis. 
R2t-1 and alphat-1 refer to the 24-month regression window preceding the investment period of 
one month. R2t-1 is listed in quartiles from left to right, low R2 value to high R2 value. Alphat-
1 is listed in quartiles from top to bottom, low alpha value to high alpha value. The R2t-1 low-
minus-high portfolio consists of a long position in funds with low R2 value and a short position 
in funds with high R2 value. The alphat-1 high-minus-low portfolio is long in high alpha value 
funds and short low alpha value funds. The values in the table are annualized monthly risk-
adjusted alphas. In parenthesis, we observe the estimated Newey-West (1987) corrected t-
statistics.  
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Table 10: FFC Results 
Portfolio alpha, sorting on lagged R2  and alpha 
 𝑅2𝑡−1 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑡−1 Low 2 3 High All Low-High 
Low -0.025 -0.004 0.015 0.011 0.002 -0.035* 
 (-1.11) (-0.23) (1.25) (1.50) (0.14) (-1.66) 
2 -0.024 0.023* 0.006 0.025*** 0.006 -0.048** 
 (-1.07) (1.79) (0.65) (3.81) (0.62) (-2.23) 
3 0.014 0.029** 0.019** 0.018*** 0.010 -0.004 
 (0.68) (2.19) (2.53) (2.60) (1.47) (-0.18) 
High 0.015 0.004 0.014 0.012* 0.010 0.003 
 (0.90) (0.38) (1.52) (1.96) (1.10) (0.21) 
All -0.003 0.013 0.014* 0.016*** 0.012 -0.018 
 (-0.16) (1.25) (1.94) (3.16) (1.48) (-1.25) 
High-Low 0.042** 0.008 -0.001 0.001 0.008  
 (2.18) (0.49) (-0.06) (0.21) (0.70)  
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
In each cell (portfolio), we present the annualized alpha, using monthly gross returns. The t-statistics 
(parentheses) are estimated using robust standard errors (Newey and West, 1987).  
Looking at the "High-minus-Low" alphat-1 portfolios, we see that the portfolio performance 
increases as R2t-1 decreases. The highest return in this sample is located amongst these 
portfolios, more specifically in the "Low" R2t-1 quartile with an alpha of 4.2%. Thus far, it 
seems to be a possibility that the most active funds could be future winners.  
A more in-depth review shows that there is no particular trend in the "High" alphat-1 portfolios, 
when moving from most active to least active. If we look at the "Low" alphat-1 portfolios, a 
more evident tendency appears. The more active funds seem to perform worse than the less 
active, especially the "Low" R2t-1 portfolio with alpha -2.5%, though not significant. It seems 
that the trend in the "High-minus-Low" alphat-1 portfolios is rather explained by the poor 
performance of "Low" alphat-1 portfolios, than the superior performance of "High" alphat-1 
portfolios.  
When looking at the R2t-1 quartiles without sorting for alphat-1 (“All”), we observe an 
increasing alpha when moving from left (low R2t-1) to right (high R2t-1). The four R2t-1 quartiles 
generates values of -0.3%, 1.3%, 1.4% and 1.6% respectively, whereas only 1.4% and 1.6% 
is significant. This indicates that less active funds create larger risk-adjusted returns, gross of 
fees. This is in line with findings from other studies on the Norwegian mutual fund market. 
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Sørensen (2010) states that active funds do not outperform the index funds. Since “closet-
indexers” barely diverge from the benchmark, you would expect the same to apply for this 
category of funds. Hence, our findings support other studies on the subject in Norway saying 
that, considering the differences in fees, investors are better off investing in index funds. 
A final evidence on R2 as a predictor of performance is found in the "Low-High" R2t-1 column. 
The "Low" and "Second" alphat-1 quartiles generate negative returns, whilst the two highest 
alphat-1 quartiles are more or less zero. This indicates that investing in the most active and 
shorting the least active ones would generate negative returns. This is also indicated when not 
sorting for alpha with a value of -1.8%.  
In general, the "High" R2 portfolios have higher alphas and more significance than the rest. 
We do not find enough consistency in our results to conclude that R2 is a predictor of 
performance. However, it indicates that the least active managed funds are generating the 
highest risk-adjusted returns. 
Another takeaway from this analysis is on persistence in performance. We see that the most 
active funds ("Low" R2t-1), in combination with a "High-minus-Low" alphat-1 portfolio 
generates a significant positive alpha of 4.2%. This indicates that if you were to invest in the 
most active Norwegian funds you should go for past winners. However, it is likely that this 
result is due to funds with low alpha is performing worse than the funds with high alpha is 
performing well.  This is in line with Sørensen (2010) and Carhart (1997), stating that 
persistence is more salient for poor performing funds than for well-performing funds. In 
addition, we see that the "Low-minus-High" R2t-1 portfolio for the two lowest alphat-1 quartiles 
gives a negative return. They obtain alphas of -3.5% and -4.8% (significant), which again 
indicates persistence in poor performing funds. Ranking solely on alphat-1 "All R2" we see that 
there is a trend, though not significant, in the relationship between alphat-1 and alpha of the 
portfolios. This may indicate that performance persistence among fund is present, at least over 
a 2-year period. 
Similar studies conducted on other markets also show inconsistent results on the relationship 
of low R2 and alpha. However, a study conducted on the US market shows that there is a 
relationship between low R2t-1 and high alpha (Amihud and Goyenko, 2013). We do not 
observe the same relationship between low R2t-1 and alpha. On the contrary, we observe that 
alpha increases as R2t-1 increases. However, the results are not statistically significant and in 
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general, the alphas is rather small or negative. We have done our analysis with shorter and 
longer estimation windows, as well as investment period, without achieving results that differ 
from what we have presented.  
As a final remark, we believe that the analysis is suffering from the skewness towards high R2 
in our sample. We have divided the sample into four quartiles based on R2. However, due to 
the many funds scoring in the upper 90's on R2, quartile three and four, will barely differ from 
each other. This interferes with our purpose, which is to see whether you can pick winners 
based on their degree of activeness. In the next section, we will try to cater for this by sorting 
R2 in two groups based on their R2, active funds and “closet-index” funds.  
7.2.2 Active Funds vs. “Closet-Indexers” 
Due to the rather small data sample (59 funds) and the samples two-folded profile concerning 
the R2 distribution, we conducted the same analysis splitting the funds into two categories 
based on their R2-score. We divide between fund with R2 > 0.95 and R2 < 0.95.  This 
segregation criteria splits the sample down the middle leaving R2 > 0.95 = 30 funds, and R2 < 
0.95 = 29 funds. This allows us to get a more distinct view on how the actual active funds have 
been performing against the "closet-indexers". In other words, we manage to distinguish the 
activeness of funds more clearly and hence examine what we intended to. From the table we 
see that the results are quite similar to what we observe in Table 10. Again, we find high alphas 
with the high R2 portfolio. The alphas in the R2 > 0.95 sample are all higher and more 
statistically different from zero than that of the R2 < 0.95 sample. Indicating the same as in the 
previous section, “closet-indexers” outperform the actively managed funds.  
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Table 11: Active versus “closet-index” 
Portfolio alpha, based on sorting on lagged R2  and alpha 
 𝑅2𝑡−1 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑡−1 Low High All Low-High 
Low -0.025 0.011 0.002 -0.036* 
 (-1.19) (1.30) (0.18) (-1.83) 
2 0.016 0.019*** 0.006 -0.003 
 (1.21) (2.99) (0.63) (-0.26) 
3 0.008 0.016*** 0.010 -0.008 
 (0.57) (2.80) (1.49) (-0.57) 
High 0.013 0.014* 0.011 -0.001 
 (1.08) (1.84) (1.08) (-0.07) 
All 0.005 0.015** 0.012 -0.010 
 (0.38) (2.59) (1.48) (-1.07) 
High-Low 0.039** 0.003 0.008  
 (2.10) (0.31) (0.72)  
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 
In each cell (portfolio), we present the annualized alpha, using monthly gross returns. The t-statistics 
(parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors (Newey and West, 1987).  
In both cases, we see that the portfolio providing the highest returns (also most statistically 
significant) is the portfolio constructed by the lowest R2 quartile and a long-short position in 
high-low alpha (3.9%). This would suggest that investing in actively managed funds that 
achieve significant returns in the previous period (24 months), may be a winning strategy.  
However, it may be the negative return of the low portfolio (-2.5%) that is the main reason for 
this outcome.  
As a concluding remark, we maintain our view of investing with regard to a funds activeness. 
The least active funds, that is R2 > 0.95, outperforms the most active half of the Norwegian 
funds.   
7.2.3 Single-Factor Model 
As we show in section 7.1.3, fund managers expose themselves to the risk factors included in 
the four-factor model (FFC). Using the FFC-model, funds are not rewarded for their exposure 
to these risk factors. In section 3.6, we describe the different definitions of active management. 
If timing (beta-bets) is actually considered active management, the four-factor model will be 
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improper. Therefore, we examine the same hypothesis as in 7.2.1. but this time, we use the 
single-factor model. That is, we only use the market factor (OSEFX index) as the explanatory 
variable in our model. The result is presented in Table 12: Single-Factor Results. 
Table 12: Single-Factor Results 
Portfolio alpha, based on sorting on lagged R2  and alpha 
 𝑅2𝑡−1 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑡−1 Low 2 3 High All Low-High 
Low 0.004 0.010 0.020* 0.019*** 0.020 -0.015 
 (0.14) (0.62) (1.84) (3.11) (1.52) (-0.57) 
2 0.020 0.028** 0.014 0.024*** 0.015 -0.004 
 (0.84) (2.30) (1.39) (4.11) (1.58) (-0.19) 
3 0.021 0.028** 0.010 0.027*** 0.014* -0.006 
 (0.95) (2.32) (1.19) (4.13) (1.79) (-0.29) 
High 0.055** 0.034*** 0.019** 0.012** 0.027** 0.042* 
 (2.19) (2.91) (2.12) (2.08) (2.21) (1.76) 
All 0.026 0.026** 0.016** 0.020*** 0.025*** 0.006 
 (1.24) (2.54) (2.18) (4.17) (2.67) (0.31) 
High-Low 0.051** 0.023 0.000 -0.007 0.007  
 (2.41) (1.48) (-0.03) (-1.03) (0.54)  
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
In each cell (portfolio), we present the annualized alpha, using monthly gross returns. The t-statistics 
(parentheses) are calculated using robust standard errors (Newey and West, 1987).  
If we compare these results with the ones from Table 10 (7.2.1.), we observe much of the same 
pattern. However, there are some interesting differences. We observe a decreasing alpha 
moving from left to right in the "High-minus-Low" alphat-1 column. This is only a weak 
indication of low R2 being a predictor of better performance, as the only significant alpha 
(5.1%) is found under the "Low" R2t-1 column.  
Looking at the top quintile alphat-1 (“High”) and the returns of the different R2t-1 portfolios, 
we see a significant decreasing alpha moving from most active to least active. This further 
strengthens the impression of low R2t-1 as a predictor of better performance. In fact, the "Low" 
R2t-1, "High" alphat-1 portfolio is producing the table's highest returns of 5.5%.  
Examining the "Low" alphat-1 row, we see the opposite, where alpha increases moving from 
left to right. The second, third and "All" alphat-1 rows provides a lot more ambiguous result. 
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In general, the "High" R2t-1 column is generating the most significant returns, with exception 
of the "High" alphat-1 row. 
Further, we turn our attention to the theoretical portfolio that has a long position in low R2t-1   
quintile funds and a short position in high R2t-1 quintile funds. The returns of this portfolio are 
presented in the rightmost column of the table. We see that the alphas in this column is more 
or less zero, for all the portfolios in the bottom three quartiles of lagged alpha. However, an 
exception is the top quintile alphat-1, which has a positive and significant alpha of 4.2%. This 
indicates that R2t-1 predicts winners amongst the previous best performing funds.  
We notice from the lagged R2 columns, that alpha is less dependent on the preceding alpha as 
the lagged R2 increases. Meaning that the distance between winners and losers amongst active 
funds is bigger than that of less active funds. Thus, it looks like investors have more to gain 
from looking at past performance when choosing more actively managed funds. Amongst the 
least active funds, past performance does not seem to predict any particular alpha in the next 
period. This trend is easily observed in the “High-minus-Low” alpha row. 
The table gives  an interesting insight in the relationship between lagged R2 and alpha. We see 
that the more active a fund is, the more you should emphasise on preceding performance when 
selecting which fund to invest. Among the preceding best performing funds it may seem like 
R2 indeed is a predictor of performance. However, a low or high, R2t-1 do not consistently lead 
to higher returns. Thus, we cannot conclude with lagged R2 being a credible predictor for 
future performance.  
The ambiguous results derived from the previous sections motivated us to divide our dataset 
into periods with different economics cycles and market conditions. In the dataset period 
between 01.1996 and 12.2014, we observe three major events affecting the world’s financial 
markets. The Asia crisis (1997-1998), the dotcom bubble (2002) and the financial crisis 
(2008). We have used these events as points of shift when looking at the activeness among the 
funds. We conducted the methodology from section 7.2.1 (Appendix 7) and get very similar 
results in each period as we do in the overall study. Concluding with that over longer time 
periods (24 months) financial cycles do not provoke a significant change in active management 
of funds. 
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7.2.4 Comparison with Other Predictors of Performance 
R2 and Active Share (AS) are both measures of active management and are therefore potential 
predictors of performance. Our findings regarding performance are inconsistent with the 
findings in both Amihud & Goyenko (2013) and Cremers & Petajisto (2009). Amihud & 
Goyenko finds that R2 is a significant predictor of fund performance, where the most active 
funds outperform the less active ones. Cremers & Pejajisto uses AS as a measure of activeness 
and finds evidence supporting Amihud & Goyenko. However, these are both studies on the 
US market. In Norway, Smørgrav and Næss (2011) conducted a study on the Norwegian 
market using AS. They imply that funds that are more active achieve higher risk-adjusted 
returns than less active funds. However, there is no clear pattern showing increasing alphas 
when AS increases. The only indication they find is that the high-low AS portfolio has a 
positive alpha of 0.67%, though not significant. We believe that the results are sensitive to 
what sample period we investigate and that this might explain some of the differences in 
results. Lastly, our results are more in line with other performance studies on the Norwegian 
market (Sørensen, 2010). After reviewing Smørgrav and Næss, we do not find a reason to 
believe that our findings are counterfactual, but rather result of different methodology and 
sample period. Furthermore, Cremers et. al. (2015) finds no evidence of R2 being a predictor 
of performance. As their study include European markets, including Norway, we find these 
results as a better comparison to ours.  
7.3 Fund Characteristics Impact on Activeness  
In this last section, we examine the effects of fund characteristics on its degree of active 
management. By fund characteristics, we mean attributes that the fund or fund management 
possess. In particular, we look at fund expenses, fund size, fund age, portfolio turnover14 and 
manager tenure. Also, we look at different investment styles. We regress each characteristic 
for each fund on a transformed measure of active management, TR2 (as described in section 
5.1.3). The regression is run using panel data and the fixed effects estimator. 
                                                          
14 This is a measure of the fund's trading activity, which is computed by taking the lesser of purchases or sales (excluding all 
securities with maturities of less than one year) and dividing by average monthly net assets. 
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7.3.1 The Determinants of Fund's R2 
We regress TR2j,t on lagged fund characteristics obtained from Morningstar and Børsprosjektet 
(NHH). Since R2 is estimated with a 24-month estimation period, we here use nine non-
overlapping periods of 24 month from 1998 to 2014. The fund characteristics are end of the 
year before the beginning of the 24-month estimation period. The implications of fund 
characteristics is estimated by a panel regression with style dummy variables, shown in the 
equation below. The standard errors are clustered by fund. 
𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2ln (𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3(ln (𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒))𝑖,𝑡−12 + 𝛽4ln (𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝛽5ln (𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑦𝑛𝑡9𝑛−1 𝑆𝑡𝑦𝑙𝑒𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡,  
In Table 13, we present the result. The coefficient of fees is negative, suggesting that 
management that is more active is associated with higher fees. Active funds gather and process 
vast amounts of information, an activity investors not easily can replicate and thus a cost they 
are willing to incur. The coefficient is significant thus linking active management with higher 
fees, as logically expected. However, as we saw in chapter 7.1.5., some funds charge high fees 
without engaging in active management.  
The negative coefficient of fund age suggest that older funds are more active and selective 
than younger funds. This is somewhat strange if we think of survival bias. The hypothesis 
behind the survivorship bias is that poor performing funds will be euthanized. Active funds 
perform poorly, thus they should be replaced more often. Subsequently leading to lower age 
among low R2 funds. Moreover, saying that older funds are more actively managed could be 
in line with what Chevalier and Ellison (1999)  finds. Although, this will only be true if longer 
fund age is somewhat equal to longer tenure. Their study claims that junior managers tend to 
“avoid unsystematic risk when selecting their portfolio.” Meaning that managers with short 
tenure choose higher R2 investment strategies, leading to portfolios with higher systematic 
risk.  However, the tenure coefficient is barely positive and insignificant, indicating that there 
is no such relationship present in our sample. We encourage further addressing of the matter. 
When looking at the two size-related variables we observe that R2 is an increasing and concave 
function of fund size. This is evident from the positive and negative coefficients of ln(size) 
and [ln(size)]2, respectively. Large funds are forced to broaden their investments because of 
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liquidity issues that arises from having large investment allocated over few stocks. That is, 
selling large volumes of a company's shares could provoke an unintentional decline in the 
share price, and even limit the possibility to sell because the lack of counterparts in the 
marketplace (Amihud et al., 2005). In addition, a positive relationship between R2 and fund 
size may reflect managers’ pursuit of status among their peers in managing a large fund (Van 
Binsbergen et al., 2008). Managers of small funds will try to improve their status by increasing 
their funds' size by choosing a more idiosyncratic investment strategy. Consequently resulting 
in smaller funds choosing strategies that lead to lower R2. However, the t-statistics for the size 
coefficients are very low thus makes these considerations far from conclusive. 
Table 13: Determinants of R2 
Explanatory variables, lagged Dependent variable:  TR2j,t 
Fee -0.607 (-4.57) 
ln(size)   0.018 (0.05) 
[ln(size)]2 -0.0001 (-0.02) 
ln(fund age) -0.443 (-4.31) 
ln(manager tenure)   0.040 (0.61) 
  
Style dummy variables  
  
Small Growth  0.009 (0.03) 
Small Blend -0.397 (-1.21) 
Small Value -0.458 (-1.51) 
Mid Growth  0.226 (0.90) 
Mid Blend  0.023 (0.09) 
Mid Value -0.115 (-0.51) 
Large Growth N/A 
Large Blend   0.131 (0.55) 
Large Value   0.190 (0.80) 
R2   0.25 
TR2 is estimated with a 24-month estimation period, using nine non-overlapping periods of 24 
months from 1998 to 2014. The fund characteristics are end of the year before the beginning of 
the 24-month estimation period. T-values are presented in parentheses The R2 presented in the 
table is this regression model’s coefficient of determination. 
In the lower part of the table, we see how different investment styles ascribes to R2. 
Morningstar Direct defines the different fund styles, and we have adopted their style definition. 
The large growth style is omitted, as there are not enough funds in our dataset that fulfil the 
style specifications. None of the dummies is significant, so we can only consider the 
coefficients as indication. As we saw in 7.1.1, active funds have a tendency to invest in small 
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cap stocks, as seen by the negative coefficient in Table 13. A positive coefficient for the large 
style dummies indicates that these fund types are associated with higher R2. High R2 funds 
will have a portfolio composition close to that of the benchmark. Thus, it will include positions 
in the largest companies at OSE. Overall, the dummy coefficients are conforming with our 
previous findings. 
7.3.2 A Snapshot of the Present Norwegian Market 
In this section, we look at the Norwegian fund market today (end of our sample). Unlike the 
previous analysis, we will in this section present an overview of how fund characteristics 
affects activeness in the most recent years (2013-2014). We use the same methodology as 
previously where we use lagged funds characteristics. Hence, the graphs show end 2012 fund 
characteristics and R2 calculated from January 2013 to December 2014. 
Academia suggests that portfolio turnover is a measure of active management, and it is 
reasonable to believe that funds that are more active have higher turnover. Wermers (2000) 
find that funds with higher turnover outperform funds with lower turnover. However, turnover 
itself cannot produce excess returns. Excess returns are only obtained by a portfolio diverging 
from a benchmark (in our case the FFC-model). In recent years, Norwegian funds' activeness 
have a positive association with turnover. Norwegian funds, in general, seems to have a 
turnover around 20-40%, implying that Norwegian funds in general have a buy-hold strategy 
(Lawton, 2009). 
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Figure 8: Scatter Plot Fund Characteristics, Turnover & Fees 
  The graphs show end 2012 fund characteristics and R2 calculated from January 2013 to December 2014 
There should be a relation between fees and active management since market analysis is 
resource intensive. As expected, we find that higher fees relate positively to lower R2. This is 
also in line with the panel regression. It is noteworthy that some funds still charge high fees 
while conducting passive management (funds located north east in the scatter plot). Investors 
should avoid these funds, and rather choose cheaper index funds. Even though The Financial 
Supervisory Authority of Norway criticized Norwegian funds for their lack of active 
management, there are still funds acting as "closet-indexers". This result is conforming to our 
results from section 7.1. 
Amihud & Goyenko (2013) indicate that there is a negative relation between fund size and R2. 
In this period, fund size has a slightly negative and insignificant coefficient, which yields an 
inconclusive answer to whether it affects a funds activeness in the recent years. We found the 
same relationship in our panel data regression.  
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Figure 9: Scatter Plot Fund Characteristics, Size & Age  
  The graphs show end 2012 fund characteristics and R2 calculated from January 2013 to December 2014 
 
The relationship between fund age and R2 is positive. This is as expected since the fund age 
coefficient for the whole sample period is positive and significant.  
Tenure has a slightly positive line of regression implying that Norwegian funds nowadays are 
more active when the manager is less experienced. This supports our findings from the panel 
regression and the aforementioned theory, although the coefficient is insignificant. 
Table 14: Scatter plot fund Characteristics, Tenure 
 The graphs show end 2012 fund characteristics and R2 
calculated from January 2013 to December 2014 
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8. Conclusion 
Active fund management has been around since dawn and accounts for a substantial part of 
the equity fund market. In this thesis, we apply the determination of coefficient, or R2, from a 
multifactor regression model as our measure of active management. Through a comprehensive 
empirical study of historical returns, we show that Norwegian fund managers might not be as 
active as they should. We find that half of our sample scores an R2 of 0.95 or above, indicating 
that they are "closet-indexers". Comparing funds with R2 less than 0.95, "closet-indexers” and 
true index funds, we find great similarities between the latter two, whilst the first group differ 
with more significant loading on the risk factors. The SMB factor absorbs most of the 
deviation from the market benchmark and reduces active management in general. We observe 
that many of the "closet-indexers" charge fees in line with the actively managed funds, 
meaning that many investors incur avoidable charges. Therefore, we would encourage 
investors to make use of their consumer power and be more critical of the fee levels charged 
by different funds. 
Amihud and Goyenko (2013) conclude with a low R2 being a predictor of better future 
performance. By using a rolling regression with a 24 months estimation window, we find no 
consistency indicating that low R2 is a credible predictor of better performance in the 
Norwegian fund market. We find that high R2, in general, outperform low R2 portfolios when 
applying a four-factor model. When using the single-factor model, thus allowing utilization of 
the risk factors in active management, low R2 seems to predict higher future performance 
among preceding winners. Interestingly, this relationship vanishes as we look at funds that 
performed poorly in the past period. Meaning that investor have more to gain from looking at 
past performance when investing in an actually active fund.  
Examining the effects of fund characteristics on its degree of active management, we mostly 
find insignificant relationships. Across funds, higher activeness is only positively associated 
with expenses and fund age. Indicating that older funds are more active, and that fund, in 
general, do not charge fees unwarranted. However, as pointed out above, the latter should be 
considered wisely.  Investment style coefficients suggest that funds that have a low R2 invest 
in small size stocks while funds with high R2 invest in large- and mid-size stocks. This is 
coherent with the apparent presence of loadings on the SMB factor.  
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Depending on your risk preference, if you only are looking for a broad market exposure, you 
should invest in index funds. If you are looking for a fair chance to beat the benchmark and 
competing funds, you should go for past winners among the most actively managed quartile 
of funds. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1- Assumptions for using OLS 
There are seven underlying assumptions for use of the OLS method on time series data. 
1. The regression model is linear in the parameters and it is correctly specified. 
 
2. X2 and X3 are uncorrelated with the error term (ε). 
 
3. The error term u has a zero mean value, that is  
𝐸(𝜀𝑖) = 0  
 
4. Homoscedasticity: This assumption is known as constant variance. The variance of the 
error variable 𝜎2(𝜀) , is required to be constant. When this requirement is violated, the 
condition is called heteroscedasticity 
 
5. Independent random variable: The random variables are not correlated (not all equal 
to the same constant) with one another, so that is, 
 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑢𝑗) = 0,   𝑖 ≠ 𝑗 
Breach of this assumption is autocorrelation.  
 
6. No exact collinearity exist between X2 and X3 
 
7. For hypothesis testing, the error term ε follows the normal distribution with mean zero 
and (homoscedastic) variance 𝜎2 that is, 𝜀𝑖 ~𝑁(0, 𝜎2). 
 
We would like to note that even if some of the assumptions are violated the method could still 
be used. The OLS will be able to estimate the parameters, however the standard errors will be 
less credible and thus affect the validity of hypothesis testing. 
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Appendix 2 - Normality tests 
  Autocorrelation Heteroscedasticity Normality 
Funds DW-estimate lower bound Upper bound B-P p-value Ryan-Joiner p-value 
Alfred Berg Aktiv 1.590 1.728 2.272 0.283 0.000 
Alfred Berg Aktiv II 1.647 1.679 2.321 0.000 0.004 
Alfred Berg Gambak 1.530 1.728 2.272 0.000 0.000 
Alfred Berg Humanfond 1.663 1.679 2.321 0.031 0.000 
Alfred Berg Norge + 1.494 1.679 2.321 0.001 0.000 
Alfred Berg Norge Classic 1.933 1.728 2.272 0.799 0.000 
Alfred Berg Norge Etisk 1.644 1.592 2.408 0.001 0.000 
Atlas Norge 1.672 1.728 2.272 0.000 0.000 
Carnegie Aksje Norge 1.978 1.728 2.272 0.000 0.000 
Danske Invest Norge I 1.966 1.728 2.272 0.000 0.000 
Danske Invest Norge II 1.967 1.728 2.272 0.000 0.000 
Danske Invest Norge Vekst 1.688 1.728 2.272 0.000 0.000 
Danske Invest Norske Aksjer 
Inst I 
1.770 1.679 2.321 0.083 0.000 
Danske Invest Norske Aksjer 
Inst II 
1.739 1.579 2.421 0.001 0.000 
Delphi Norge 2.213 1.728 2.272 0.042 0.000 
DNB Norge 1.910 1.728 2.272 0.001 0.000 
DNB Norge (Avanse I) 1.896 1.728 2.272 0.869 0.000 
DNB Norge (Avanse II) 1.873 1.728 2.272 0.935 0.000 
DNB Norge (I) 1.768 1.728 2.272 0.047 0.000 
DNB Norge (III) 1.836 1.728 2.272 0.002 0.000 
DNB Norge (IV) 1.676 1.592 2.408 0.001 0.000 
DNB Norge Selektiv 1.834 1.728 2.272 0.649 0.000 
DNB Norge Selektiv (II) 1.820 1.679 2.321 0.011 0.000 
DNB Norge Selektiv (III) 1.834 1.728 2.272 0.011 0.000 
DNB SMB 1.666 1.679 2.321 0.017 0.057 
Eika Norge 1.535 1.592 2.408 0.018 0.000 
Eika SMB 1.795 1.679 2.321 0.001 0.001 
Fondsfinans Norge 1.698 1.592 2.408 0.009 0.000 
FORTE Norge 2.147 1.336 2.664 0.728 0.299 
Globus Aktiv Acc 1.718 1.566 2.434 0.156 0.723 
Globus Norge II Acc 1.698 1.579 2.421 0.084 0.845 
Handelsbanken Norge 1.757 1.728 2.272 0.706 0.000 
Holberg Norge 1.622 1.679 2.321 0.065 0.036 
KLP AksjeNorge 1.843 1.679 2.321 0.041 0.000 
NB Aksjefond 1.935 1.728 2.272 0.690 0.000 
Nordea Avkastning 2.227 1.728 2.272 0.007 0.000 
Nordea Kapital 2.245 1.728 2.272 0.761 0.000 
Nordea SMB 1.865 1.728 2.272 0.000 0.202 
Nordea Vekst 2.097 1.728 2.272 0.010 0.000 
ODIN Norge 2.031 1.728 2.272 0.002 0.000 
ODIN Norge II 1.500 1.592 2.408 0.003 0.000 
Pareto Aksje Norge A 1.619 1.592 2.408 0.004 0.000 
Pareto Aksje Norge B 1.602 1.592 2.408 0.001 0.000 
Pareto Aksje Norge I 1.635 1.679 2.321 0.017 0.000 
Pareto Investment Fund A 1.942 1.728 2.272 0.347 0.000 
Pareto Investment Fund B 1.938 1.728 2.272 0.347 0.000 
Pareto Investment Fund C 1.936 1.728 2.272 0.345 0.000 
PLUSS Markedsverdi 2.006 1.728 2.272 0.000 0.000 
RF Aksjefond Acc 1.698 1.592 2.408 0.000 0.005 
RF Plussfond Acc 1.694 1.378 2.622 0.623 0.069 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 2.092 1.728 2.272 0.724 0.000 
Storebrand Norge 2.268 1.728 2.272 0.000 0.000 
Storebrand Norge H 1.632 1.592 2.408 0.001 0.000 
Storebrand Norge I 1.801 1.679 2.321 0.064 0.000 
Storebrand Norge Institusjon 1.913 1.249 2.751 0.764 0.174 
Storebrand Optima Norge 1.791 1.679 2.321 0.082 0.000 
Storebrand Vekst 1.878 1.728 2.272 0.022 0.000 
Storebrand Verdi 1.868 1.728 2.272 0.008 0.000 
Terra Norge 1.547 1.679 2.321 0.000 0.000 
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Appendix 3 - Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test for random effects 
TR2 [Fundid,t] = Xb + u[Fundis] + e[Fundid,t] 
    
Estimated results:    
  Var sd = sqrt(var)  
TR2 0.409293 0.63976  
e 0.190077 0.435978  
u 0.148181 0.384943  
    
Test: Var(u)  = 0  
chibar2 (01)               = 72.9  
Prob > chibar2 = 0.00000  
 
 
Appendix 4 – Hausman test 
 
 Coefficients   
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 fixed random Difference S.E. 
fee -0.313 -0.313 -3.89E-15 . 
lnsize 0.28541 0.28541 -2.19E-13 . 
lnsize2 -0.0083 -0.0083 5.45E-15 . 
lnage -0.027 -0.027 1.28E-14 . 
lntenure -0.033 -0.033 -1.08E-15 0 
     
b = consistent under H0 and Ha; obtained from xtreg 
B = Inconsistent under Ha, efficient under H0; obatained from xtreg 
     
Test: H0: differences in coefficients nor systematic 
     
chi2(5) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) 
 = 0.00   
chi2 < 0 ==> model fitted on these data fails to meet the asymptopic assumptions of the 
Hausman test; see suest for a generalized test 
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Appendix 5: Robust Breusch-Pagan test (Robust Hausman test) 
tr2 Coef. Std. Err. z  P> │z│ [95% Conf. Intervall] 
fee -0.31303 0.10756 -2.91 0.004 -0.52383 -0.10222 
lnsize 0.28541 0.53185 0.54 0.592 -0.75700 1.32783 
lnsize2 -0.00829 0.01349 -0.61 0.539 -0.03473 0.01814 
lnage -0.02705 0.07279 -0.37 0.71 -0.16971 0.11562 
lntenure -0.03295 0.05130 -0.64 0.521 -0.13349 0.06759 
_cons 1.27396 5.22918 0.24 0.808 -8.97505 11.52297 
        
sigma_u 0.38494245      
sigma_e 0.43597838      
rho 0.43807024 (fraction of variance due to u_i)     
 
Test of over identifying restrictions: fixed vs random effects 
Cross-section time-series model: xtreg re 
Sargan-Hansen statistic  30.438  Chi-sq(5)    P-value = 0.0000 
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Appendix 6: Sample of funds 
Fund Name Date Span Observations AUM (NOK Millions) 
Operating fee 
(%) 
Alfred Berg Aktiv 199601-201412 228 452 1.50 
Alfred Berg Aktiv II 199710-201209 180 16 1.60 
Alfred Berg Gambak 199601-201412 228 877 1.80 
Alfred Berg Humanfond 200001-201412 180 95 1.80 
Alfred Berg Norge + 199801-201403 195 832 0.70 
Alfred Berg Norge Classic 199601-201412 228 883 1.20 
Alfred Berg Norge Etisk 200204-201403 144 75 1.70 
Atlas Norge 199803-201412 202 43 0.75 
Carnegie Aksje Norge 199601-201412 228 479 1.20 
Danske Invest Norge I 199601-201412 228 512 2.00 
Danske Invest Norge II 199601-201412 228 895 1.25 
Danske Invest Norge Vekst 199601-201412 228 322 1.75 
Danske Invest Norske Aksjer Inst I 200005-201412 176 3006 0.90 
Danske Invest Norske Aksjer Inst II 200612-201412 97 5351 0.90 
Delphi Norge 199601-201412 228 913 2.00 
DNB Norge 199601-201412 228 7326 1.80 
DNB Norge (Avanse I) 199601-201402 218 2171 1.81 
DNB Norge (Avanse II) 199601-201409 225 75 1.20 
DNB Norge (I) 199601-201402 218 2787 1.80 
DNB Norge (III) 199603-201412 226 140 1.09 
DNB Norge (IV) 200212-201412 145 8929 0.75 
DNB Norge Selektiv 199605-201412 224 924 2.01 
DNB Norge Selektiv (II) 200201-201412 156 283 1.01 
DNB Norge Selektiv (III) 199601-201412 228 4214 0.80 
DNB SMB 200104-201412 165 1118 2.01 
Eika Norge 200310-201412 135 1276 2.00 
Eika SMB 199805-201309 185 42 2.27 
Fondsfinans Norge 200301-201412 144 2115 1.00 
FORTE Norge 201104-201412 45 19 2.00 
Globus Aktiv Acc 199812-200604 89 N/A 0.80 
Globus Norge II Acc 199812-200610 95 N/A 2.00 
Handelsbanken Norge 199601-201412 228 1765 2.00 
Holberg Norge 200101-201412 168 603 1.50 
KLP AksjeNorge 199904-201412 189 4715 0.75 
NB Aksjefond 199609-201308 205 104 2.27 
Nordea Avkastning 199601-201412 228 1806 2.00 
Nordea Kapital 199601-201412 228 4111 1.00 
Nordea SMB 199706-201412 211 154 2.00 
Nordea Vekst 199601-201412 228 882 2.00 
ODIN Norge 199601-201412 228 4874 2.00 
ODIN Norge II 200406-201412 127 105 0.90 
Pareto Aksje Norge A 200210-201412 147 1873 1.84 
Pareto Aksje Norge B 200601-201412 108 912 2.01 
Pareto Aksje Norge I 200110-201412 159 4426 0.50 
Pareto Investment Fund A 199601-201412 228 232 1.80 
Pareto Investment Fund B 199601-201412 228 23 0.95 
Pareto Investment Fund C 199601-201412 228 150 0.50 
PLUSS Markedsverdi 199601-201412 228 117 0.90 
RF Aksjefond Acc 199711-200702 112 N/A 2.00 
RF Plussfond Acc 200202-200605 52 N/A 2.00 
Storebrand Aksje Innland 199608-201412 221 1569 0.60 
Storebrand Norge 199601-201412 228 386 1.50 
Storebrand Norge H 200511-201405 103 535 0.28 
Storebrand Norge I 200005-201412 176 3929 0.28 
Storebrand Norge Institusjon 201101-201401 37 760 0.20 
Storebrand Optima Norge 200101-201412 168 323 1.00 
Storebrand Vekst 199601-201412 228 632 2.00 
Storebrand Verdi 199801-201412 204 1416 2.00 
Terra Norge 199805-201309 185 605 2.20 
Alfred Berg Indeks I 200411-201412 98 256 0.08 
Carnegie Norge Indeks 199601-201412 228 13 0.80 
DNB Norge Indeks 201009-201412 52 644 0.32 
KLP AksjeNorge Indeks 200510-201412 111 8472 0.10 
KLP AksjeNorge Indeks II 200810-201412 75 862 0.20 
PLUSS Indeks 199601-201412 228 28 0.70 
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Appendix 7: Period dependent results 
 𝑅2𝑡−1 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑡−1 Low 2 3 High All Low-High 
Low -0.060 -0.039 -0.055** 0.004 -0.042 -0.064 
 (-1.19) (-1.08) (-2.17) (0.33) (-1.27) (-1.45) 
2 -0.059 0.003 -0.025 0.009 0.000 -0.067 
 (-1.12) (0.12) (-1.09) (0.70) (-0.02) (-1.38) 
3 0.002 -0.006 0.000 0.012 0.012 -0.009 
 (0.05) (-0.20) (-0.00) (1.08) (0.73) (-0.20) 
High 0.099** -0.003 0.035 0.032** 0.038** 0.065* 
 (2.44) (-0.12) (1.65) (2.66) (2.10) (1.76) 
All 0.005 -0.010 -0.006 0.015 0.012 -0.006 
 (0.13) (-0.44) (-0.33) (1.56) (0.93) (-0.34) 
High-Low 0.168*** 0.038 0.095*** 0.028** 0.083***  
 (3.23) (1.00) (3.31) (2.17) (2.83)  
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
 Portfolio returns Period 1 (01.1998-03.2003): Results using gross returns.  
  
 𝑅2𝑡−1 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑡−1 Low 2 3 High All Low-High 
Low -0.053 -0.055 -0.020 -0.003 -0.034 -0.050 
 (-1.33) (-1.68) (-1.01) (-0.22) (-1.37) (-1.35) 
2 -0.024 0.019 0.014 0.024* 0.013 -0.047 
 (-0.73) (0.81) (0.73) (1.85) (0.86) (-1.39) 
3 0.081 0.041 0.017 0.029** 0.029** 0.051 
 (1.69) (1.68) (0.99) (2.16) (2.07) (1.14) 
High 0.058 0.056** 0.050*** 0.032** 0.064*** 0.026 
 (1.66) (2.60) (3.48) (2.32) (3.08) (0.77) 
All 0.018 0.017 0.018 0.021* -0.003 0.019 
 (0.58) (0.87) (1.26) (1.94) (-0.11) (1.17) 
High-Low 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.071*** 0.035** 0.100***  
 (3.18) (3.35) (3.58) (2.24) (4.31)  
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Portfolio returns Period 2 (02.2003-05.2008): Results using gross returns. 
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 𝑅2𝑡−1 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑡−1 Low 2 3 High All Low-High 
Low -0.082*** -0.031 0.003 -0.006 -0.034* 0.033 
 (-2.94) (-1.46) (0.21) (-0.80) (-1.71) (0.94) 
2 -0.041 -0.003 0.017 0.009 -0.002 0.003 
 (-1.30) (0.25) (1.45) (1.03) (-0.15) (-0.07) 
3 0.012 0.015 0.021* 0.010 0.017 -0.050 
 (0.37) (0.67) (1.82) (1.13) (1.63) (-1.61) 
High 0.052 0.034 0.031** 0.019* 0.038* -0.077*** 
 (1.41) (1.40) (2.40) (1.80) (1.93) (-2.97) 
All -0.012 0.006 0.018* 0.009 0.012 -0.021 
 (-0.48) (0.37) (1.88) (1.34) (0.93) (-0.85) 
High-Low 0.144*** 0.067** 0.027* 0.025** 0.074***  
 (3.82) (2.30) (1.74) (2.26) (3.54)  
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
Portfolio returns Period 3 (02.2009-12.2014): Results using gross returns. 
 
